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SHOULD I STAY OR SHOULD I Go: THE NATIONAL GUARD
DANCES TO THE TUNE CALLED BY Two MASTERS*
Passages in the main body of the Constitution make clear
that control of the National Guard is shared between the fed-
eral government and the states. Relying on these passages, most
courts and commentators have concluded that the federal gov-
ernment's control predominates over that of the various states.
The author presents a new approach to this seemingly settled
area of the law by arguing that the second amendment altered
the allocation of control found in the main body of the Consti-
tution. Therefore, a careful balancing of state and federal inter-
ests must be undertaken whenever the federal government exer-
cises its control over the National Guard.
The issue of shared control of National Guardsmen has
again become an important issue. In 1986, Congress amended
existing law to prevent State Governors from blocking federal
training of their National Guardsmen in overseas locations.
Several Governors challenged the new legislation on constitu-
tional grounds in 1987. This Note concludes with an analysis of
one such case, Perpich v. Department of Defense. Perpich was
decided in favor of the federal government by a federal district
court in 1987. That decision was successfully contested by Gov-
ernor Perpich in the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
* The author is an active duty U.S. Naval Officer assigned by the Navy to Case
Western Reserve Law School. His educational expenses are subsidized in full by the
Navy's Law Education Program. Post-graduate educational programs such as this one are
provided routinely to career Naval officers. Nevertheless, the views expressed herein are
solely those of the individual author. They may not be considered as the official views of
the Judge Advocate General, the Department of the Navy, or any other agency or
department of the United States. Finally, copyright protection for this particular work is
unavailable because it is a "work of the United States Government." 17 U.S.C. § 105
(1986).
The author gratefully acknowledges the long suffering patience of his wife, Donna,
whose support was vital to the creation of this Note. In addition, the wise guidance of
Professor Jonathan L. Entin, Case Western Reserve School of Law, proved indispensible.
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Unfortunately, the decision of the court of appeals was issued
too late for inclusion within this Note.
The opinion of the court of appeals is noteworthy in at
least two respects. First, it creates a conflict in the circuits be-
cause the first circuit has held that the new statute is constitu-
tional. Second, the decision adopted several of the themes ad-
vanced in this Note when the court utilized principles embodied
within the second amendment as a ground of decision.
"The struggle between local control and centralized authority in
government is as old as history."1
THIS NOTE analyzes the balance of constitutional authority be-
tween the state and federal governments in military affairs. Its
focus highlights the interplay between two specific constitutional
powers: the states' militia power2 and the army power granted to
the federal government.3
Our constitutional predecessor, the Articles of Confederation,
absolutely withheld the army power from the central government.4
Thus the federal government was stripped of the ability to main-
tain an army. Only the states were permitted to keep armies. The
rationale supporting this rule was that an army, if placed in the
hands of the federal government, would pose too great a risk to
both the peoples' liberties in an American democracy and to the
states' prerogatives under the American system of federalism.5 To
preserve these important values a national defense strategy was
fashioned which permitted each governor to maintain a state mili-
tary force, known as the state militia.6 With the passage of time,
these same state militia came to be known as the National Guard,
1. Price v. United States, 100 F. Supp. 310, 315 (Ct. Cl. 1951).
2. See infra notes 59-70 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 71-74 and accompanying text.
4. No provision of the Articles of Confederation authorized the central government
to raise or equip an army. Rather, the Articles provided that "every State shall always
keep up a well regulated and disciplined militia, sufficiently armed and accoutered ...."
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. VI, § 4 (1777). The central government was, however,
permitted to "make requisitions from each State" of these militia troops. Id. art. IX, § 5.
Further, the central government was granted the authority to appoint "all officers of the
land forces, in the service of the United States, excepting regimental officers." Id. art. IX,
§ 4.
5. See infra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
6. Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 380 (1918); Shaw, The Interrelation-
ship of the United States Army and the National Guard, 31 MIL. L. REV. 39, 41-42




the name by which they are known today.7
The Articles of Confederation permitted the central govern-
ment to request troops from the states in order to form a tempo-
rary national army if circumstances threatened the collective good
of the country.? By withholding army powers from the central
government and bestowing militia powers upon the states, the Ar-
ticles of Confederation struck the balance of governmental power
in this area squarely in favor of the states.
This scheme was re-examined and modified in the Constitu-
tional Convention of 1787. The Constitution's approach was dra-
matically different from that of the Articles. It took a middle
ground by refusing to elevate the states' military power above that
of the federal government. Militia powers remained vested in the
states but army powers were also given to the central government.
The blending of these two powers has created numerous contro-
versies in the years since. Perpich v. United States Department of
Defense,9 now pending before the United State Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit, is but the most recent example.
The Perpich litigation directly challenges a legislative provi-
sion tacked onto the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 1987.10 The challenged provision, known as the
Montgomery Amendment,"1 radically broadens the federal gov-
7. Members of the various states' military forces were originally called "militia." In
1824-25, General Lafayette brought the term "National Guard" to the United States.
"During the French Revolution. . . [he] had been commander of a French trained volun-
teer force which had assumed the designation 'National Guard.'" Shaw, supra note 6, at
54. "The term captured the public interest and from 1825 onward 'National Guard' was
applied to all state troops in America." Id. at 55.
8. The Articles of Confederation also created the body which served as the forerun-
ner of our modern day Senate. It was called the "Committee of the States" and was em-
powered to "agree upon the number of land forces, and to make requisitions from each
State for its quota." ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IX, § 5 (1777).
9. Perpich v. United States Dep't of Defense, 666 F. Supp. 1319 (D. Minn. 1987),
appealfiled, No. 87-5345-MN (8th Cir. Aug. 12, 1987).
10. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987, Pub. L. No. 99-661, §
522, 100 Stat. 3816, 3871 (1986).
11. The bill bears the name of its sponsor. A Mississippi Democrat, "Representative
G.V. 'Sonny' Montgomery. . . is a member of the House Armed Services Committee and
a retired major general in the Mississippi National Guard." Montgomery, Stop This As-
sault on Our Defense, USA Today, Feb. 11, 1987, at A10, col. 1. Additionally, Represen-
tative Montgomery is "the principal spokesman in Congress for the Guard's Washington
lobby, the National Guard Association." Kennedy, Conflict Brews Over Training of Na-
tional Guard Units, Christian Sci. Monitor, Aug. 6, 1987, at 5, col. 2. Supplementing the
clout wielded by sympathetic congressmen such as Representative Montgomery, is the par-
tisan advocacy of the National Guard's powerful lobbying body, the National Guard Asso-
ciation. See generally, 0. BRADLEY, A GENERAL'S LIFE 483 (1983)(commenting on the
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ernment's power to conduct National Guard training exercises.
Previously, the federal government was required to obtain the
Governor's consent before ordering a National Guard unit onto
active duty for annual training. 12 In prior decades no Governor
had ever withheld his consent, but the 1980's saw a rapid increase
in National Guard training deployments to overseas, and some-
times politically sensitive, locations.' In 1985 and 1986, several
Governors either withheld or threatened to withhold their consent
for controversial training exercises in Honduras. 4 Congress re-
sponded with the Montgomery Amendment which expressly
removes the Governors' ability to withhold consent for training ex-
ercises "because of any objection to ...location."' 5 Having lost
their battle in the halls of Congress,' the Governors17 brought
politically powerful National Guard lobby); S. HUNTINGTON, THE SOLDIER AND THE
STATE 171-72 (1957)(outlining the events which led to the creation of the National Guard
Association in 1878). Due in part to the savvy political skills of its promoters, addition of
the Montgomery Amendment onto the much larger appropriations statute was a develop-
ment that went "largely unnoticed" in Congress. Glickman, Governors vs. U.S. - Who
Should Control National Guard?, Christian Sci. Monitor, Nov. 4, 1986, at 3, col. 1. How-
ever, at least one Congressman noted that passage of the amendment was premature since
not a single hearing was held on the matter. 132 CONG. REc. H6,265 (daily ed. Aug. 14,
1986)(statement of Representative Edwards, critical of adoption of the amendment be-
cause no hearing was held in the House of Representatives to examine the "serious consitu-
tional questions" raised by it).
12. 10 U.S.C. § 672(b) (1986)(prior to its amendment by Pub. L. No. 99-661, §
522, 100 Stat. 3816, 3871 (1986)).
13. The number of National Guard and other reserve units deployed overseas for
training increased more than fifteenfold between 1980 and 1985 (117 units in 1980 to
1,932 units in 1985). Department of Defense Appropriations for 1987: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on the Dep't of Defense of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 99th Cong.,
2nd Sess. 578 (1986)(statement of James H. Webb, Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Reserve Affairs). "The National Guard trains in more than 40 countries around the world
every year." Id. at 604. "About 5800 guardsmen from 23 states participated in Honduran
maneuvers" in 1986 and at least 1500 were slated to travel there in 1987. Glickman, Presi-
dent's New Control Over the National Guard is Challenged, Christian Sci. Monitor, Feb.
9, 1987, at 8, col. 1.
14. The governors of Arizona, Ohio, and Maine each "turned down federal requests
to send National Guard units from their states to maneuvers" in Honduras. Kennedy,
supra note 11, at 5, col. 2.
15. "The consent of a Governor. . .may not be withheld. . . because of any objec-
tion to the location, purpose, type, or schedule of. . .active duty." National Defense Au-
thorization Act For Fiscal Year 1987, Pub. L. No. 99-661, § 522, 100 Stat. 3816, 3871
(1986). See also 132 CONG. REC. H6,264 (daily ed. Aug. 14, 1986)(Representative Mont-
gomery, sponsor of the amendment, stated that the effect of the new law would be to deny
State Governors the authority to block overseas training of National Guard troops only if
"he or she thinks the guardsmen are needed at home for local emergencies.").
16. 132 CONG. REC. H6,264-68 (daily ed. Aug. 14, 1986); 132 CONG. REC. E2,872-
73 (daily ed. Aug. 13, 1986).
17. Amici curiae who joined forces in support of Governor Perpich include the Gov-
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suit in federal district court claiming that the Montgomery
Amendment usurped their constitutionally granted militia powers.
The federal government, on the other hand, argued that the
Montgomery Amendment was nothing more than a legitimate ex-
ercise of its constitutionally granted army powers, made necessary
because various Governors attempted to inject themselves into the
arena of foreign affairs.8
The question thus presented is the same one that has gone
unanswered since the Constitution replaced the Articles of Con-
federation. Given that the Constitution grants army powers to the
federal government while simultaneously granting militia powers
to the states, what limitations, if any, does the one grant of power
impose upon the other? The answer formulated by this Note is
premised on the notion that the second amendment to the Consti-
tution requires governmental use of the federal army power to ac-
comodate the militia rights guaranteed to the states. This argu-
ment draws support from an historical survey of the Constitution
itself, followed by an analysis of congressional and judicial activity
in the proceeding years.
ernors of Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Iowa, Kansas, Louisianna, Maine, Mas-
sachusetts, Ohio, Rhode Island, and Vermont. Memorandum of Law of Amici Curiae,
Perpich v. United States Dep't of Defense, 666 F. Supp. 1319 (D. Minn. 1987)(No. 3-87
CIV 54), appealfiled, No. 87-5345-MN (8th Cir. Aug. 12, 1987).
18. Many of the governors indicated that they would withhold their consent for over-
seas National Guard training because they were opposed to the American military presence
in countries bordering Nicaragua. For example, in a press release dated August 4, 1987,
Governor Richard Celeste of Ohio stated his reasons for refusing to allow Ohio National
Guardsmen to train in Honduras. He said:
As a result of my recent trip to Central America, I still feel that sending Na-
tional Guard troops to that area is unnecessary, dangerous, and provocative be-
cause of the military buildup in Honduras . . . I have refused to send them
[National Guard troops] because I believe it is a bad idea to send the Ohio
National Guard to train in a country bordering on Nicaragua.
Statement of Governor Richard Celeste, Press Release (Aug. 4, 1987). The consensus
among Governors, who are opposed to the training (including Minnesota's Governor
Perpich), is that the National Guard is being used to build facilities designed ultimately for
use by the Contra Rebels in their campaign to overthrow Nicaragua's Sandinista govern-
ment. Under the guise of federal training missions in Honduras "American forces have
built air strips and radar facilities around the country." Glickman, supra note 11, at 4, col.
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I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL TEXT
A. Background
The central government which was created under the Articles
of Confederation was extremely weak. In the area of military af-
fairs and national defense it was nothing more than a "paper ti-
ger" because the power to raise and support armies had been
vested exclusively in the states.1" This issue was reopened at the
Constitutional Convention because of the general feeling that the
absence of a national army was partially responsible for the huge
cost of the Revolutionary War.2" Needless difficulties engendered
by states who were slow to fill the quotas imposed by the central
government provided additional evidence that the distribution of
military powers between the central government and the states es-
tablished under the Articles was an issue ripe for review. 21 It is
not surprising, therefore, that "[n]o question was more thoroughly
discussed by the Constitutional Convention than the military
power to be entrusted to the national government."22
B. The Anti-Federalist Position
The Anti-Federalists, led by Patrick Henry (who refused to
attend the constitutional convention),23 were strongly opposed to
the notion of replacing the Articles of Confederation with a new
constitution.2 4 Instead, they favored merely amending the Arti-
19. Burger, Lawyers and the Framing of the Constitution, CASE & COM., Sept.-Oct.
1987, at 3, 4. See generally supra notes 4 & 8.
20. Rogers, Military Powers of Nation and State Under the Constitution, 50 AM. L.
REV. 321, 325 (1916). George Washington wrote that "[s]hort enlistments and a mistaken
dependence upon militia, have been the origin of all our misfortunes and the great accumu-
lation of our debt." E. LEE, POLITICS OF OUR MILITARY NATIONAL DEFENSE, S. Doc. No.
274, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 10 (1940). Washington said further that the militia will "come
in you cannot tell how, go you cannot tell when, and act you cannot tell where, consume
your provisions, exhaust your stores, and leave you at last at a critical moment." Id. See
also infra notes 88-95 and accompanying text.
21. Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 380 (1918).
22. Rogers, supra note 20, at 325. See also J. SCOTT, THE MILITIA, S. Doc. No. 695,
64th Cong., 2d Sess. 29-38 (1917)(probably the finest collection of materials shedding light
upon the militia powers and the intent of the framers; included are extracts from the jour-
nals and debates of the federal convention, the state ratification debates, the Congress, the
Federalist and other papers relating to the militia).
23. Burger, supra note 19, at 6. "[H]e refused to be a delegate from Virginia, be-
cause, as he put it, he 'smelled a rat.' The 'rat' he smelled was the idea of creating a strong
central government under a constitution that would replace the loose Articles of Confeder-
ation." Id.
24. Speeches by Patrick Henry before the Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 5 &
[Vol. 39:165
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des. Further, the Anti-Federalists fought vigorously to deny the
national government the power to raise armies.25 From a modern
perspective, quarrel over this issue seems quaintly outmoded be-
cause, for several decades, Americans have accepted the necessity
of a standing army to protect the national interest. However, ex-
cesses suffered by the framers at the hands of the King's army26
and the historical lessons learned from the behavior of Julius Cae-
sar's army in ancient Rome 27 convinced many that a standing
army was "the bane of liberty. 28
Instead of a standing army providing for the nation's defense,
the Anti-Federalists advocated the use of a well regulated militia
maintained by each state. These militia would be under the con-
trol of the State Governor but subject to requisition by the na-
tional government in time of need.29 The Anti-Federalists thus fa-
7, 1788), reprinted in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVEN-
TION DEBATES 199-216 (R. Ketcham ed. 1986).
25. See Ansell, Legal and Historical Aspects of the Militia, 26 YALE L.J. 471
(1917); Rogers, supra note 20; Shaw, supra note 6, at 54-55; Wiener, The Militia Clause
of the Constitution, 54 HARV. L. REV. 181 (1940).
26. An explicit account of the numerous abuses visited upon the citizens of England
and the colonists in America is contained in Engdahl, The Legal Background and After-
math of the Kent State Tragedy, 22 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 3 (1973).
27. That the American populace was sensitive to the historical lessons recorded by
prior Republican societies (i.e. the Greek and Roman empires) is reflected in the essays of
the time. See "Brutus", Essay No. X to the Citizens of the State of New York, N.Y.
Journal, Jan. 24, 1788, reprinted in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE CONSTITU-
TIONAL CONVENTION DEBATES 287-88 (R. Ketcham ed. 1986)(it is believed that "Brutus"
was in fact Robert Yates, a New York judge and a delegate to the Federal Convention).
[T]he liberties of the commonwealth was [sic] destroyed and the constitution
overturned, by an army, lead [sic] by Julius Caesar, who was appointed to the
command, by the constitutional authority of that commonwealth. He changed it
from a free republic, whose fame had sounded . . . into that of the most abso-
lute despotism. A standing army effected this change, and a standing army sup-
ported it through a succession of ages, which are marked in the annals of his-
tory, with the most horrid cruelties, bloodshed, and carnage ....
Id.
28. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 749-51 (J. Gales ed. 1834). See also The Address and
Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of the Convention of Pennsylvania to their Constitu-
ents (Dec. 18, 1787), reprinted in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE CONSTITU-
TIONAL CONVENTION DEBATES 254-56 (R. Ketcham ed. 1986). The minority feared that:
A standing army in the hands of a government placed so independent of the
people, may be made a fatal instrument to overturn the public liberties; it may
be employed to enforce the collection of the most oppressive taxes, and to carry
into execution the most arbitrary measures. An ambitious man who may have
the army at his devotion, may step up into the throne, and seize upon absolute
power.
Id. at 254.
29. See sources cited supra note 25. The prevailing sentiment was that:
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vored perpetuating the arrangement provided by the Articles of
Confederation."0
C. The Federalist Position
The very opposite point of view was advanced by the Federal-
ists, including Alexander Hamilton,3' John Jay, James Madison, 2
and John Marshall. They urged the framers to grant an army
power to the central government. 3 The unsatisfactory battle rec-
ord of the militia bolstered their claim that reliance on the militia
had nearly "lost us our independence . . . . [T]he steady opera-
tions of war against a regular and disciplined army can only be
The standing army with its upper-class officers and lower-class enlisted men was
basically an aristocratic institution. It was associated with the British Crown and
with European despotism. It was quite unnecessary in the eyes of many Ameri-
cans. The distance of the United States from Europe meant that it required no
permanent military force with the possible exception of small frontier garrisons
to deal with the Indians. Consequently, it was generally agreed that primary
reliance must be put on a citizen militia composed of part-time officers and en-
listed men.
S. HUNTINGTON, supra note 11, at 166-67.
30. See supra notes 4 & 8 and accompanying text.
31. Hamilton argued in THE FEDERALIST that if the central government was denied
an army power then future generations would be unable to adequately protect themselves.
The authorities essential to the common defense are these: to raise armies; to
build and equip fleets; to prescribe rules for the government of both; to direct
their operations; to provide for their support. These powers ought to exist with-
out limitation, because it is impossible to foresee or to define the extent and
variety of national exigencies, and the correspondent extent and variety of the
means which may be necessary to satisfy them. The circumstances that endan-
ger the safety of nations are infinite, and for this reason no constitutional
shackles can wisely be imposed on the power to which the care of it is commit-
ted. This power ought to be coextensive with all the possible combinations of
such circumstances; and ought to be under the direction of the same councils
which are appointed to preside over the common defense.
THE FEDERALIST No. 23, at 153 (A. Hamilton)(C. Rossiter ed. 1961)(emphasis in
original).
32. Madison argued that constitutional restraints upon the army power threatened
the safety of the United States. It was foolishness to constitutionally "chain the discretion"
of the central government because there existed no countervailing "chain" upon the ambi-
tion of all other nations. THE FEDERALIST No. 41, at 257 (J. Madison)(C. Rossiter ed.
1961).
33. Both Hamilton and Marshall (who served as officers in General Washington's
army during the Revolution) observed first hand how an inadequate military power vested
in the national government resulted in "terrible privations" and "needless deaths." Burger,
supra note 19, at 3-4. See also W. RIKER, SOLDIERS OF THE STATES 1 (1957)(the record of




successfully conducted by a force of the same kind." 4 They ar-
gued that the nation's very survival required that the power to
raise armies be given to the national government and that failure
to grant this important power was to invite "certain and inevitable
ruin"35 at the hands of foreign invaders.
The Anti-Federalist warnings of inevitable doom, which
would follow granting the central government an army power,36
were neutralized by a Federalist-proposed system of checks and
balances,37 which would prevent the army from usurping the
power of the elected government and oppressing the people. An
additional accommodation inherent in the Federalist's approach to
national defense was a temperance of their demand that the cen-
tral government be given an army power with a concomitant will-
ingness to accept a militia power shared between the state and
federal governments.3 8
D. The Resulting Compromise
Rather than adopt one position to the exclusion of the other,
the framers of the Constitution incorporated both the Anti-Feder-
alist and the Federalist plans. The resulting constitutional text
steered a middle road, allowing both a militia 9 which could be
requisitioned for federal use in time of need40 and a national
army. 1 The army and militia were unmistakably separate and in-
34. THE FEDERALIST No. 25, at 166 (A. Hamilton)(C. Rossiter ed. 1961). See also
JOINT COMM. ON THE REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY, REPORT ON REORGANIZATION OF
THE ARMY, S. Doc. No. 555, 45th Cong., 3d Sess. 90 (1878) [hereinafter REORGANIZA-
TION OF THE ARMY] ("[D]ependence upon the militia ... [was to] rely upon a broken
staff."). The militia were a "destructive, expensive and disorderly mob." Id. at 94. They
were "totally unacquainted with every kind of military skill ... timid and ready to fly
from their own shadows." Id. at 90.
35. REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY, supra note 34, at 91; see generally sources
cited supra note 25.
36. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
37. See infra notes 71-74 and accompanying text.
38. THE FEDERALST No. 27, at 176-77 (A. Hamilton)(C. Rossiter ed. 1961). Ham-
ilton was careful to stress, however, that the militia should be under the control of the
central government because it was the central government which bore the responsibility for
maintaining the national security. Id. at 174-75.
39. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 allows the states to keep troops (militia) provided
consent of the Congress is first obtained.
40. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15 provides that Congress shall have the power to call
"forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Inva-
sions . . . ." These are commonly referred to as the militia "call" provisions.
41. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 12 provides "Etihe Congress shall have Power ... To
raise and support Armies ......
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dependent of each other42 and the use of neither was mandated.
The power of choice between them, or the concurrent use of them
both, was left to the wisdom of Congress in the exercise of its
power to "provide for the common Defence."4
E. Implications of the Second Amendment
Ratification of the Constitution by the states was a Federalist
triumph because, inter alia, of the inclusion of the army power for
the federal government."" However, consent was grudgingly ob-
tained from the more reluctant states45 only because they were
promised that "one of the first items of business of the new gov-
ernment would be the framing of amendments. ' 46 The primary
objectives of these states were to trim federal power by guarantee-
ing certain trial rights for criminal defendants, freedom of the
press, and a limitation upon the military powers reposed in the
federal government.47 These developments show that the battle for
42. The bright line separating the militia from the army is explicitly acknowledged
in the constitutional text where, on at least two occasions, the militia is contemplated as
distinct from the army. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2 vests the President with commander-in-
chief powers over the army and the militia. U.S. CONST. amend. V excuses both the army
and the militia from compliance with certain grand jury requirements. Accord Selective
Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 382 (1918); see also Authority of President to Send Mili-
tia Into a Foreign Country, 29 Op. Att'y Gen. 322, 322 (1912)("From very early times
• ..the militia has always been considered and treated as a military body quite distinct
and different from the Regular or standing army.").
43. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. I states that "[tihe Congress shall have Power To...
provide for the common Defence . . .of the United States .... "
44. The Anti-Federalists vehemently opposed inclusion of the army power. See supra
note 25 and accompanying text. One commentator has suggested that the Anti-Federalists
lost the debate over the Constitution for three reasons: They were less clever advocates,
they were less skillfull politicians, and they had the weaker argument. H. STORING, WHAT
THE ANTI-FEDERALIST'S WERE FOR 71 (1981).
45. Many states felt that they had "been deprived of the power of self-defense...
[due to the] centralization of the taxing and military authorities." H. STORING, supra note
44, at 35. See also S. HUNTINGTON, supra note 11, at 167 ("The ratifying conventions
were even more strongly opposed to regular military forces [than the federal constitutional
convention] . . . . Criticism of [the army power] . . .was widespread in the state
conventions.").
46. H. STORING, supra note 44, at 65; see also S. HALBROOK, THAT EVERY MAN BE
ARMED 74 (1984)("The objections of the anti-Federalist[s] ...particularly George Ma-
son and Richard Henry Lee, prompted the state-ratifying conventions to recommend cer-
tain declarations of rights which became the immediate source of the federal Bill of
Rights.").
47. H. STORING, supra note 44, at 64-65. The amendments operated not only to clip
federal power in favor of the states, but also supplied incentives for the federal government
to decline the use of its granted powers. For instance, the third amendment, adopted simul-
taneously with the second, created one such incentive bearing on federal use of the army
[Vol. 39:165
NATIONAL GUARD
power waged between the central government and the states con-
tinued even after the ratification process was at an end. Adoption
of the Bill of Rights signified the "major legacy of the Anti-Feder-
alists"48 because it significantly reduced the central government's
power in these areas.
The Constitution, in its original form, afforded Congress the
luxury of choice in the area of national defense. Congress could
raise an army or it could permit the states to maintain their own
militia which could be pressed into federal service upon the occur-
rence of any of the three constitutional "call" provisions.49 Con-
gress' ability to refuse permission to the states is found in article I,
section 10 which provides: "No State shall, without the Consent of
Congress. . . keep Troops. . . in time of Peace. . . ."" Vesting
this discretion in the central government meant the end of state
primacy in the area of military affairs. It also meant that the
army power was not limited by the militia power.
Adoption of the second amendment altered this arrangement.
Its language provides: "A well regulated Militia, being necessary
to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and
bear Arms, shall not be infringed."'" Article I, section 10 clashes
with the command of the second amendment because it would be
inconsistent to permit Congress to deny the states the prerogative
of keeping troops while acknowledging that "[a] well regulated
Militia . . . [is] necessary to the security of a free State."52 The
interpretation which correctly harmonizes these two provisions is
that the second amendment amends article I, section 105a by elim-
power. This subtle result was accomplished by placing an incidental advantage favoring the
militia vis-a-vis the army. The third amendment's prohibition against quartering soldiers in
any house without the consent of the owner applied equally to soldiers and militiamen. See
Engblom v. Carey, 677 F.2d 957, 961 (2d Cir. 1982)("National Guardsmen are 'Soldiers'
within the meaning of the Third Amendment. . . ."). This prohibition against quartering,
however, removed an economical method of providing shelter for soldiers in the perform-
ance of their duties away from their post. Thus, when faced with the need for a federal
force to accomplish a military task in a particular region of the nation, the Congress could
"call" into federal service whichever state militia resided in the area. These militiamen,
unlike federal troops, could perform military tasks in the vicinity of their homes without
placing on the federal government the financial burden of lodging.
48. "It is often said that the major legacy of the Anti-Federalists is the Bill of
Rights." H. STORING, supra note 44, at 64.
49. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
50. US. CONsT. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
51. US. CONST. amend. II.
52. Id.
53. It is a natural use of the amendment process to alter specific passages in the
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inating the requirement of Congressional consent.54 Thus, passage
of the second amendment mandated the state's right to keep
troops as a matter of constitutional law. Indeed, the Supreme
Court has held that the "obvious purpose" of the second amend-
ment was to assure the continuation of the militia.55 Constitu-
tional protection of the states' militia rights was guaranteed even
at the cost of removing the central government's prerogative to
prohibit ownership of firearms.56 The central government was thus
compelled to shoulder certain risks to insure that the existence of
the various state militia would not be infringed.
This result is hardly surprising. Aside from the implications
of the language presented by these constitutional passages, re-
moval of article I, section 10's consent provision is consistent with
the overall theme behind the adoption of the Bill of Rights. Few
would dispute that the Bill of Rights was adopted to limit the
grant of power given the central government in the main text of
the constitution.57 Additionally, since the framers justified the
original Constitutional text. See United States v. Louisiana, 123 U.S. 32, 35 (1887)(the
purpose of the 11 th amendment was to amend article III, § 2); Civil Rights Cases, 109
U.S. 3 (1883)(the purpose of the 13th amendment was to amend article IV, § 2); Elk v.
Wilkens, 112 U.S. 94 (1884)(the purpose of the 14th amendment, § 2 was to amend article
I, § 2); Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920)(the purpose of the 16th amendment was
to amend article I, § 9). Similar arguments can be made regarding the twelfth, seventeenth
and twentieth amendments.
54. Rogers, supra note 20, at 326 (the second amendment denied Congress the abil-
ity to prohibit the states from maintaining militia forces). Accord id. at 336 (We know that
historically the second amendment was adopted to amend that portion of section 10 of
Article I of the Constitution which said that "no State shall, without the Consent of Con-
gress keep Troops. . . in time of Peace .. "); W. RIKER, supra note 33, at 9-10 ("[T]he
Second Amendment to the Constitution was intended to guarantee the permanence of the
division of control over the militia.")(emphasis in original). Cf. Selective Draft Law Cases,
245 U.S. 366, 381 (1918)(The court held that the framers, in supplying the army power to
the central government and prohibiting the states from maintaining militia forces without
Congressional consent, had removed all military powers from the states. Implications of the
second amendment were not discussed by the court.).
55. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1938).
56. In Miller, the Supreme Court held that the central government would be without
authority to deny a citizen his sawed off shotgun if it could be shown that possession of the
weapon had "some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regu-
lated militia .... " 307 U.S. at 178.
57. "[P]assage of [the Bill of Rights was] in response to the spirit of dissatisfaction
expressed by . . . the States at the time of their ratification of the Constitution, and the
general demand of the country for further limitation upon the powers of the Federal Gov-
ernment." H. AMES, THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES DURING THE FIRST CENTURY OF ITS HISTORY 19 (1970); see also T. BRANT, THE
BILL OF RIGHTS: ITS ORIGIN AND MEANING 47 (1965)("The great object in view was to
limit and qualify the powers of government."). Those who would argue that the Bill of
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central government's army power by arguing that the states could
use their militia to repel any danger presented by a federal stand-
ing army, it follows that protection of the states' militia rights was
unexceptional (even among the Federalists).58
F. The Militia Powers
The "Militia of the several States" 59 could be called into fed-
eral service only upon the occurrence of one or more of three con-
stitutionally enumerated contingencies (the constitutional "call"
provisions): first, when needed to "execute the Laws of the
Union";6 0 second, when needed to "suppress Insurrections"; 6 or,
third, when needed to repel an invasion.62 These provisions were
drawn so that Congress could elect to entrust the national defense
solely to the militia of the several states (a result that would bring
satisfaction to the Anti-Federalists). However, the three exclusive
conditions limiting federal access to the militia suggest that these
state armies were not intended to serve as a general purpose fight-
ing force. For instance, if the national government desired an of-
fensive projection of military power abroad, resort to the army
power would be mandatory."' Constraining federal access to state
militia troops in this fashion also speaks to the underlying con-
cerns of the subsequently adopted second amendment. By disal-
lowing unfettered federal discretion, the states retained primary
use of their militia troops with minimal federal interference.
Rights was intended to limit the power of the central government in its dealings with indi-
vidual citizens but not in its dealings with states are contradicted by the blackletter of the
tenth amendment.
58. In THE FEDERALIST No. 46, Madison urges the states to accept the army power.
He argues that the downfall of state governments at the hands of a federal army would be
impossible because the state militia would "be able to repel the danger." THE FEDERALIST
No. 46, at 299 (J. Madison)(C. Rossiter ed. 1961). See also S. HALBROOK, supra note 46,
at 68 (quoting Tench Coxe - a friend of Madison and a prominent Federalist)("The militia
...will form a powerful check upon the regular troops ...."). See also id. at 83
("Whenever a people. . . entrust the defence of their country to a. . .standing army...
the power of that country will remain under the direction of the most wealthy citizens...
[y]our liberties will be safe as long as you support a well regulated militia.").
59. U.S. CONST. art.II, § 2, cI. 1.
60. US. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. This issue received close scrutiny in Authority of President to Send Militia Into a
Foreign Country, 29 Op. Att'y Gen. 322, 322 (1912). The opinion concluded that the mili-
tia was "liable to be called into the service of the Government only upon the particular
occasions named in the Constitution." Id. at 323.
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Congress could ensure the desired state of militia readiness
because it held the power to organize, arm, and discipline the
state militia.64 Additionally, Congress held the power to devise the
training regimen to be undertaken by the militia troops.6 5 These
provisions were responsive to the federalist desire for a "regular
and disciplined" 6 fighting force which could ably defend the
country when called upon.
However, certain provisions operated to deny Congress signif-
icant control over the militia. The power to appoint the militia's
officers" and to conduct the training of the militia 8 was reserved
for the states.
Power over the state militia was diffused not only between
the Congress and the states, but the President as well. He was to
act as "Commander in Chief of . . .the Militia of the several
States, when called into the actual Service of the United
States. '69 Thus, commander-in-chief duties over the militia were
shared between the President and the various State Governors."0
G. The Army Powers
Initially, it should be noted that unlike the militia, the fram-
ers placed no limits upon the purposes to which the army could be
employed. The army was, thus, a general purpose fighting force
available for service wherever the central government should
choose to send it. An additional point of difference between the
army power and the militia power was that no control over the
army was reserved to the states. Control over the army resided
only with the central government.
So that the army would not be able to wrest "from the people
that liberty they had so dearly earned,"71 three significant limita-
64. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 16 gives Congress the power to "provide for organiz-
ing, arming, and disciplining the Militia ...."
65. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 16 specifically reserves to the states "the Authority of
training the Militia ... according to the discipline prescribed by Congress."
66. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
67. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 16 reserves to the states "the Appointment of the
Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by
Congress."
68. Id.
69. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
70. This aspect makes the National Guard unique because no other military force in
the world maintains dual loyalties or serves dual commanders. W. RIKER, supra note 33, at
1-2.
71. "Brutus", supra note 27, at 288.
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tions were saddled upon the national government's exercise of its
army power. First, an army could exist only if Congress chose to
"raise and support" one.72 Thus, the army could be disbanded at
the pleasure of Congress. Second, Congress could fund the army
for not more than two years at a time.73 Periodic review of fund-
ing was intended to keep an obedient army close by its civilian
master's heel. The third limitation was the diffusion of authority
over the army among the executive and legislative branches. Con-
gress could raise armies, but only the executive could exercise
command.74
II. CONGRESSIONAL ACTIVITY
A. The Militia Act of 1792
The Militia Act of 179275 was the first exercise by the Con-
gress of its constitutionally conferred militia powers. Since this
Act did not blend the army and militia powers, it provides little
aid in determining what limitations these powers impose upon
each other when applied jointly (as in Perpich78 ). Nevertheless,
the act merits close attention because it set in motion the forces
which led to the initial statutory intermingling of the militia and
army powers some 124 years later.7 7
The Act illustrates a Congressional choice to place primary
emphasis on the militia powers with recourse to the army powers
only when needed. 78 This policy contemplated the maintenance of
72. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 12 provides that "The Congress shall have Power...
To raise and support Armies ......
73. US. CONsT. art. I, § 8, ci. 12 provides that "no Appropriation of Money [for
support of the army] . . . shall be for a longer Term than two Years."
74. US. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl. I provides that the "President shall be Commander
in Chief of the Army . . . of the United States .... 1"
75. Militia Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 32, 1 Stat. 271, repealed by an Act of Feb. 28,
1795, ch. 36, 1 Stat. 424.
76. Perpich v. United States Dep't of Defense, 666 F. Supp. 1319 (D. Minn. 1987),
appealfiled, No. 87-5345-MN (8th Cir. Aug. 12, 1987).
77. The National Defense Act of 1916 was the first time that the Congress chose to
blend the militia and army powers. See infra notes 118-30 and accompanying text. But see
S. HUNTINGTON, supra note 11, at 171 (claiming that the intermingling of army and mili-
tia powers first occurred with the adoption of the Dick Act in 1903). In 1957 it was noted
that the army and militia powers had become so intermingled that the militia was almost
completely "nationalized." W. RIKER, supra note 33, at 99.
78. The act allowed access to state troops by the federal government in language
that mirrored the Constitutional "call" provisions. If the federal government needed troops
for other purposes, or troops in larger numbers than the state militia could supply, then
recourse to a draft under the army power would follow. Extensive analysis of the workings
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only a bare bones army during peacetime.7 9 Thus, each national
military conflict began with militia troops "called" into federal
service, supplemented by those few regular army troops then in
existence. Of course, the army's number would swell during war-
time because the Congress would compel military service by im-
plementing a draft under its army powers. However, at war's end,
the army was always reduced to its impotent peacetime comple-
ment. This approach was followed in the War of 1812,80 the Civil
War,"' and even as late as the Spanish-American War in 1898.82
It was not discarded until well into the twentieth century. 3
Congress chose not to raise a permanent army for several
reasons. First, there was little disruption of the status quo since no
army had been raised in the history of this country except when
required by the onset of war. Second, the expense involved in rais-
ing and equipping an army posed a major deterrent.84 Third, there
of the Militia Act of 1792 has been performed elsewhere and need not be repeated here.
See, e.g., Wiener, supra note 25, at 186-88.
79. The U.S. Army numbered only about 1,300 officers and men at the time the act
was adopted. Shaw, supra note 6, at 46. See also Wiener, supra note 25, at 186.
80. At the outset of the War of 1812, the army consisted of only "several thousand
regulars" who "were chained to the frontier forts and the coast line." W. GANOE, THE
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY 116-17 (1942). Faced with difficulties in raising
the army on a moment's notice, the Congress "threw up its hands altogether and passed its
responsibility to the States by asking the Governors to have 80,000 officers and men ready
to march .... " Id. at 118. The army reached a peak strength of approximately 60,000
men. Yet, at war's end, "a law was passed limiting the army to 10,000 men . Id. at
146.
81. The nation entered the Civil War in 1860 with an army of less than 13,000 men.
Id. at 244. "Having no regular army in sight, . . . [President Lincoln] had to fall back on
the old law of 1795 [the Militia Act of 1792] and to turn in desperation to the militia of
the states." Id. at 249. The President called out 75,000 militia. Simultaneously, he sought
to increase the army to approximately 79,000 men (22,714 new regulars and 42,834 under
a three year enlistment). Id. at 251. Six months later the President sought 500,000 three
year volunteers. Id. at 259. Yet, at war's end the army was cut back to only 25,000 men.
Id. at 261.
82. At the beginning of 1898, the Army numbered less than 25,000 (compared to the
U.S. population of 73,000,000). Id. at 370. With war imminent, the President called for
125,000 volunteers from the militia. Id. at 372. "The next day legislation more than
doubled the size of the regular army . . . . But Congress was wary. It was careful to
provide that as soon as hostilities were over the army should return to its former impotent
size." Id. at 372-73.
83. See The National Defense Act of 1920, oh. 227, subch. I, § 2, 41 Stat. 759
(omitted in codification) (adopted at the conclusion of World War I, this statute permitted,
for the first time in our nation's history, maintenance of a substantial peacetime standing
army (280,000 enlisted men)).
84. There were many who subscribed to the rule that a "standing army in peacetime
could never be sufficient to meet war needs, unless so large that it would bankrupt the
Republic." E. LEE, supra note 20, at 13.
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was a general fear that a large army would seize power from the
elected government. The dire prediction voiced by the Anti-Feder-
alists during the constitutional convention85 left its mark on the
early Congress, many of whom were themselves participants in the
Constitutional Convention of 1787.
Finally, there was little need to raise an army because it was
thought that the militia would offer an able substitute. The lim-
ited purposes to which the militia might be put, as defined by the
constitutional "call" provisions, were of little concern because the
chief threats facing the nation were the Indians on the western
frontier, the British to the north (across the Canadian border),
and the Spanish and French on the eastern seaboard. Defense of
the borders, a purely domestic task, fell easily within the limited
purposes specified in the "call" provisions of the militia clause.
Projection of military force into foreign lands was hardly contem-
plated by the national policy makers in 1792. Additionally, it was
thought that the Act had cured those deficiencies which led the
Federalists to declare that "dependence on the militia . . . [was to
rely] upon a broken staff."'86 Pursuant to the power to organize,
arm, and discipline the militia, the Act contained numerous provi-
sions intended to guarantee a militia which was fully equipped
and battle ready.
Unfortunately, those portions of the Act which were meant to
ensure an ably trained militia met with failure.87 With the passage
of time, the axiom that an "adequate defense of country and laws
[can] . . . be secured through the Militia" '88 became little more
than a shibboleth. Two factors led to this conclusion. First, empir-
ical evidence indicated that use of the militia led to failure and
needless bloodshed during the first two years of each war in which
the United States was involved.89 The prime causes for this failure
85. See supra notes 23-30 and accompanying text.
86. REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY, supra note 34, at 90.
87. The terms of the Militia Act were ill-conceived. "Under this law, every able-
bodied man between 18 and 45 was. . . enrolled in the militia, and required to arm and
equip himself at his own expense. Annual returns were prescribed, the result of which was
that the militia was, in most communities, mustered once a year." Wiener, supra note 25,
at 187. This infrequent training negatively impacted efficiency. Further complications arose
because Congress delegated to the states its power to prescribe the training regimen to be
followed. The resulting creation was a militia force untrained, unreliable, and utterly ill-
equipped to perform whatever tasks were entrusted to it by the central government. See
generally Shaw, supra note 6, at 46-47 (outlining the provisions of the Militia Act).
88. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1938).
89. The setbacks that have resulted each time the federal government has trans-
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were deficient training9" and the appointment of "political gener-
als" 1 within the militia. This result is amply demonstrated by the
nation's performance in several early conflicts. For example, the
United States clearly lost the initial two and one half years of the
Revolutionary War." In the War of 1812, over the course of a
formed the various state militia into a single fighting force to act in defense of the nation
have never served to doom the overall war effort. Rather, the early failures at war's onset
were each time reversed, approximately two years into the conflict, with victory the ulti-
mate result. See infra notes 92-94 and accompanying text. This trend was still apparent as
late as World War II. See COMMITTEE ON CIVILIAN COMPONENTS, RESERVE FORCES FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY 2 (1948) [hereinafter The Gray Report] (report to the Secretary of
Defense finding that "[i]t ook two years of extraordinary effort under Federal control
before [the National Guardsmen called into federal service in 1940] were prepared for
offensive combat operations"). It is interesting to note that the findings of the Gray Report
were never acted upon by Congress. Some speculate that the powerful National Guard
lobby effectively "bottled up" the report. W. RIKER, supra note 33, at 99; accord 0. BRAD-
LEY, supra note 11, at 483.
90. Deficient training resulted in militia troops who were unprepared to handle the
duties cast upon them when war broke out. "It is the old story of the use and abuse of
amateurs in war." W. GANOE, supra note 80, at 383. The militia troops became "the vic-
tims of those superficial politicians who loudly contend that you can develop a clerk into a
soldier overnight without murdering him or holding him up to shame in battle." Id. These
training difficulties were compounded by the dual nature of the militia's "organization and
mission." See generally NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT
OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS (1968)(Commission's re-
port to President Johnson evaluating, inter alia, the effectiveness of National Guard use in
response to the racial riots which erupted across the country in 1963-67. The report com-
plements this note in that the former criticizes National Guard proficiency in the execution
of its state mission while the latter criticizes National Guard proficiency in the execution of
its federal mission.). On the one hand, the state militia was devoted to the state mission of
"protect[ing] life and property and preserv[ing] order and public safety within the state it
serve[d]. On the other hand, [the militia had] a Federal mission to provide . . . trained
personnel . . . to augment the Active Army . . .in time of war ...." Id. at 275.
91. "Belief in citizen-soldiers became inextricably intertwined with an undying faith
in the martial prowess of untrained men led by political generals." Wiener, supra note 25,
at 183. The State Governors possessed a constitutionally granted power to appoint the of-
ficers of the militia and they used it principally to reward deserving civilians who had
garnered their favor. Thus, the militia forces operated at a terrible disadvantage when
opposed in war by foreign armies commanded by officers with professional training and
battlefield experience. Even as late as 1940, most of the senior National Guard com-
manders were "political appointees who were militarily incompetent." 0. BRADLEY, supra
note 11, at 108. This practice was also common among Presidential appointments of regu-
lar army officers. "The prevailing view was . . . that soldiering did not require professional
training, a view which found striking expression in President Polk's plan to appoint Senator
Benton as Lieutenant General so that he might rank and control the two Whig Major
Generals, Scott and Taylor." Weiner, supra note 25, at 190.
92. The Revolutionary War was one in which "nearly 400,000 frantically raised
soldiers . . . sought to drive little more than 40,000 of the enemy from our shores." W.
GANOE, supra note 80, at 116. Generally speaking, the war effort was begun on June 21,
1775. On that day the Congress vested command of the Continental Army in George
Washington. Id. at 2-3. His army was composed mainly of militia units supplied by the
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two year war, the militia troops "called" into federal service were
ineffective, and it was the Navy that eventually won the war for
the United States.93 Similarly, two and one half years of blood-
shed elapsed in the Civil War before the militia gained profi-
ciency. 4 The first two years of World War II also illustrate this
various colonies. Sprinkled among their number were a few federal soldiers (continental
troops). "Everything bespoke irregularity . I..." d. at 4. Military training and knowledge
was virtually non-existent. The deplorable situation was highlighted by Washington's rec-
ommendation that Congress provide troops in "a proportion of two to one against the Brit-
ish in order to make up in numbers for the American deficiency in quality." Id. at 26. The
army, however, was not entirely without success in the early years of the Revolution. In
March, 1776, the British General Howe elected to abandon the city of Boston rather than
to engage the American force. Id. at 22-23. Success, however, was fleeting. Pursuit of
General Howe, and the resulting New York campaign in the fall of 1776 was an expensive
failure. It was followed up with defeats at Fort Washington, Fort Lee, the Brandywine, and
Germantown. Id. at 48. Excepting minor skirmishes, it was not until the fall of 1777 at
Saratoga that the American army would engage the enemy and emerge with a decisive
victory. Id. at 47-48. In February, 1778, the arrival from Germany of Frederick von Steu-
ben signalled a much needed improvement in the efficiency of the army. Id. at 54-61. These
two events, the victory at Saratoga and the arrival of von Steuben, foretold the turning
point in the Revolutionary War. They came approximately two years after the nation had
pinned its hopes for success in the war on the militia supplied by the various colonies.
93. The War of 1812 required the country, once again, to call upon the various state
militia because the army consisted of only a few thousand regulars. See supra note 80. Of
the many Governors, several simply denied the federal request for militia. The militia
troops that were sent were largely undisciplined and "had to be urged along often at the
point of the bayonet ... " W. GANOE, supra note 80, at 119. War was declared on June
18, 1812. Id. at 120. By August, militia ineptitude led to the fall of Detroit and the passage
of the nation's northwest into the hands of the British. Id. at 121. Shortly thereafter, at
Queenstown, the New York militia saw 225 of its number slaughtered while "an over-
whelming force of American militia ... looked on calmly." Id. at 122-24. During the
same period of time, "some smaller units of regulars were giving good accounts of them-
selves." Id. at 131-32. Finally, "[a]fter two years of war the training and discipline that
had been discarded as lost arts after the Revolution were brought from their hiding
places." Id. at 137-38. The lone positive militia contribution came at Fort Erie and the
battle of Chippewa in July 1814. However, the "crowning disgrace of the war" - the
militia's cowardly abandonment of the nation's capital and the subsequent burning of it by
the British - was yet to come. Id. at 139. The war ended in late 1814 "solely on account
of political conditions and a successful navy." Id. at 142. The army was dismantled without
delay because the national policy dictated but a token federal army coupled with reliance
on federal use of the various state militia. See supra note 80.
94. The army numbered fewer than 13,000 men at the beginning of the Civil War.
The President was forced, once again, to turn in desperation to the militia of the states. See
supra note 81. The few northern army regulars who could be brought from their Indian
fighting stations in the west were "engulfed in the great vortex of irregular volunteers" and
state militia. W. GANOE, supra note 80, at 253. This was the situation when South Caro-
lina seceded from the Union on December 20, 1860. At one point in the war "a whole
regiment and a battery of artillery among the militia shamefully went home ...because
their enlistment had expired . ... Id. at 257. At Bull Run, in July 1861, masses of
northern militia fled from the enemy while "[t]he single battallion of regulars . ..[,]
conspicuous in its orderliness and energetic daring," protected the retreat. Id. at 259. A
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point. 5 Second, the limited purposes for which the militia could
be used under the constitutional "call" provisions became an in-
creasingly drastic drawback as the United States achieved world
power stature.96
The combination of these two problems spurred a re-exami-
nation of Congress' chosen defense policy. No longer could the
United States afford to suffer failure during the first two years of
each war she entered. If she did, the war might end in defeat
before the United States could bring effective military force to
bear. The element of time had become an increasingly significant
factor as improved technologies gradually overcame the insulating
effect of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.9 7
In addition, the constitutional bottlenecks preventing the use
of the militia abroad were hampering the implementation of for-
eign policy. As the United States assumed the status of a world
nervous Congress expanded the army on the condition that it be reduced to 25,000 once
peace was secured. Id. at 261. It was February, 1862 before the north realized its "first
real victory." Id. at 275. Nonetheless, 1862 would belong to the Confederacy due to Union
mismanagement. "The southern government wisely abandoned states' rights for their army
shortly after they had begun to fight . I..." Id  Thus, "[w]hile the Union was organizing
as a loose Confederacy, the Confederacy was organizing as a close Union." Id. Not until
the southern defeat at Gettysburg and Grant's simultaneous capture of Vicksburg on July
4, 1863, would the war effort swing to the Union's favor. The Union ultimately prevailed,
but only after losing the first two and one half years of the conflict.
95. The Gray Report, supra note 89, at 2. See also 0. BRADLEY, supra note 11, at
108-10.
96. The plain language of the Constitution enumerates only three purposes to which
the militia may be put. These are the "call" provisions contained in the militia clause. See
supra text accompanying notes 60-62. "These three occasions, representing necessities of a
strictly domestic character, plainly indicate that the services required of the militia can be
rendered only upon the soil of the United States .... " EFFICIENCY OF THE MILITIA, H.R.
REP. No. 1094, 57th Cong., 1st Sess., at 22 (1902) [hereinafter EFFICIENCY OF THE MILI-
TIA]. "And it is but just to infer that the enumerations of the specific occasions on which
alone the militia can be called into the service of the General Government was [sic] in-
tended as a distinct limitation upon their employment." Id. "They can not, consequently,
be used to invade the territory of a neighboring country, or to enforce any public rights
abroad." Id. How these constitutional provisions could hamstring national policy became
clear when, during the War of 1812, the New York Militia refused to cross into Canada to
battle the British. Wiener, supra note 25, at 189. This same problem arose later with ever
greater frequency. It ruled out militia service in the Mexican War, Cuba, Puerto Rico, and
the Philippines. Id. at 190 & 192.
97. The critical issue of time was initially recognized by the Senate in 1892.
With the introduction of steam, electricity, and arms of precision, the "pomp
and circumstance of glorious war" went out, and with them departed the digni-
fied slowness which characterized military operations of the period when com-
batants took their time about wars, and their duration was from seven to thirty
years. Modern wars are short and sharp.
EFFICIENCY OF THE MILITIA, supra note 96, at 16.
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power she would require access to a military force commensurate
with her needs.
The Spanish-American War of 1898 became "our military
eye-opener"98 because it brought home to Congress the lessons of
militia ineptitude. For the first time since 1792, there was devel-
oping a political resolve to thoroughly rethink the national defense
policy.
B. The Dick Act of 1903
One possible remedy for the many problems which surfaced
under the old Militia Act of 1792 was to discontinue reliance
upon the militia. If the central government chose to raise a perma-
nent army there would be little federal use for the militia. Instead,
the militia would be left entirely to the states' control. The na-
tional concern over the unsatisfactory performance of the militia
when "called" into federal service, as well as the constitutional
problems which limited employment of the militia to purely do-
mestic situations, would evaporate.
The alternative remedy was to tinker with the pre-existing
system, thereby preserving the reliance traditionally placed on the
militia and thus obviating the need to raise a federal peacetime
army. This option seemed plausible because there was ample op-
portunity to improve the inadequate scheme of militia training
utilized by the old Militia Act of 1792.11 Furthermore, the possi-
bility of eliminating the need to raise a standing army was still an
attractive option, for the reasons previously discussed.100 Accord-
ingly, this latter approach was the one selected when the Dick Act
of 1903101 was enacted.
The Act contained numerous provisions designed to improve
the readiness and training of the militia while simultaneously
demonstrating a healthy respect for "the traditional militia limita-
tions."102 It directed that the militia be equipped with standard
98. Wiener, supra note 25, at 193.
99. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
100. See supra text accompanying notes 83-86.
101. Act of Jan. 21, 1903, ch. 196, 32 Stat. 775 amended by Act of May 27, 1908,
ch. 204, 35 Stat. 399 [hereinafter The Dick Act]. The Secretary of War during this period
was Elihu Root. It has been suggested that the option of raising an army was never seri-
ously considered, in part, because Root "was blinded to the needs of a 'well-regulated mili-
tia.'" E. LE9, supra note 20, at 14.
102. Wiener, supra note 25, at 195. Every able bodied man between the ages of
eighteen and forty-five who had declared an intention to become a citizen would belong to
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United States Army gear'0 3 and prescribed a more rigorous train-
ing schedule' 0' to combat militia ineptitude. The Act also intro-
duced the term "National Guard" into the statutory scheme.10 5
However, the nagging constitutional obstacles preventing the use
of the National Guard "for general military purposes outside the
national boundaries"'106 persisted. The popular theory expressed at
that time was that if ever the need for troops on foreign shores
exceeded the army's strength level, large numbers of militia
troops, perhaps even entire units, would shed their militia status
and volunteer for active service in the United States Army. But,
due to a flurry of legislative activity which preceded the coming
era of military hostilities (culminating in World War I), the plan's
volunteer provision was never tested.
C. The Second Dick Act (1908)
The Second Dick Act' 0 7 represented a final attempt by Con-
gress to preserve its policy of reliance upon the militia. The origi-
nal Dick Act of 1903 had cured the training problems which were
viewed as the chief cause of militia ineptitude. The Second Dick
Act tried to eliminate the constitutional bottlenecks which were
thought to prohibit use of the militia abroad. The Act failed.
In amending the Dick Act of 1903, the Second Dick Act pro-
vided that the militia, when called into the service of the United
States, could be used "either within or without the territory of the
the state militia (some would provide active service, the rest would occupy a reserve sta-
tus). The Dick Act, supra note 101, at § 1. The President could call the militia into federal
service for a period not exceeding nine months if needed to repel an invasion, suppress an
insurrection, or execute the laws of the Union (the traditional "call" provisions enumerated
in the militia clause of the Constitution). Id. § 4.
103. The Dick Act, supra note 101, at § 13 (Militia troops were to receive "such
number of the United States standard service magazine arms, with bayonets, bayonet scab-
bards, gun slings, belts, and such other necessary accouterments and equipments as are
required for the Army of the United States .... "). This was a significant change from the
Militia Act of 1792 which required each militia man to "equip himself at his own ex-
pense." See supra note 87.
104. The act required the states to muster their organized militia for an instructional
period of five consecutive days per year. The additional requirement for twenty four indi-
vidual assemblies for drill and instruction was also imposed. The Dick Act, supra note 101,
at § 18. The Secretary of War was authorized to subsidize these various training periods
for the states. Id. § 14. Only a single muster annually was required under the Militia Act
of 1792. See supra note 87.
105. The Dick Act, supra note 101, at § 1.
106. Wiener, supra note 25, at 198.
107. Act of May 27, 1908, ch. 204, 35 Stat. 399 amended by Act of April 21, 1910,
ch. 185, 36 Stat. 329 [hereinafter The Dick Act II].
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United States."108 Since the members of the National Guard were
seemingly agreeable to this waiver of territorial limitations0" no
attention was paid to the new law - "except perhaps [by] those
lawyers interested enough in the subject to read the limited pur-
poses for which the Constitution had authorized the Federal use of
the militia." 110 The voice of such a lawyer was not heard and the
issue lay unnoticed until 1912 when the Attorney General, George
Wickersham, concluded that Constitutional limitations precluded
"sending the militia into a foreign country in time of peace
... 11111 The debate over the use of the militia and the army was
thus reopened. Congress responded four years later with the adop-
tion of the National Defense Act of 1916.
D. The National Defense Act of 1916
The war festering in Europe, which was to grow into World
War I, the uncertain use for which the National Guardsmen
might be employed in an overseas conflict, and a defense burden
spanning two hemispheres1 2 combined to signal the departure of
the important role previously enjoyed by the states in national
military policy. The shift of power to the central government, pro-
108. Id. § 5.
109. Officials within the National Guard had long fought to obtain "full recognition"
for the contribution to national defense they felt their organization was fit to deliver. Price
v. United States, 100 F. Supp. 310, 313 (Ct. Cl. 1951)("When the 1903 act became a law
the National Guard officials thought their long fight for full recognition at last had been
won."). See also Wiener, supra note 25, at 197 (The guardsmen received their quid pro
quo in return for accepting the territorial waiver. One of the provisions of section five
required the President to turn to the National Guard instead of raising volunteers when the
Regular Army required assistance to accomplish a given domestic task.). The eager atti-
tude of the National Guard officials has carried down to the present day. The Montgomery
Amendment, which portends a larger involvement of National Guardsmen within the na-
tional defense picture, is strongly supported by the National Guard because it "strips the
governors of their authority to block training." Kennedy, supra note 11, at 5.
110. Ansell, Status of State Militia Under the Hay Bill, 30 HARV. L. REV. 712, 713
(1917). Presumably State Governors of the early 1900's did not vigorously guard federal
access to their National Guardsmen as would Governor Perpich and others. Id. See supra
notes 10-18 and accompanying text (in recent years several governors attempted to limit
federal control by withholding their consent for training exercises of National Guard troops
overseas).
S111. Authority of President to Send Militia Into a Foreign Country, 29 Op. Att'y
Gen. 322, 324 (1912).
112. Secretary of War Garrison offered this reason as a factor impelling an expan-
sion of the nation's defense forces during his testimony before the Senate in 1916. He
referred to American interests in the Philippines, China, Puerto Rico, and the canal in
Panama to illustrate his point. E. LEE, supra note 20, at 36-37.
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vided for, but not required by the Constitution, n3 had begun.
Two options received serious consideration. The first, sup-
ported by Secretary of War Garrison, involved the use of the
army power to create a small standing army, with a reserve of
500,000 troops subject to instant call (the "continental army"). 4
Under this plan, the National Guard would be left entirely to the
states.115 Of course, National Guardsmen would be free to volun-
teer for federal service if war erupted. The federal government
would completely control the field of national defense - the states
would be excluded. Critics claimed that such a militaristic ap-
proach "would have been a step toward erasing our historic State
and community loyalties, and, as such, would have tampered with
the very foundation of our Republic.""'
The second option centered on the quest to find some means
by which federal control of the National Guard could be ex-
panded, resulting in retention by the states of influence in the area
of national military affairs. "[D]o not abandon the militia, but
federalize it" argued the militia lobby." 7 Under this plan, army
expansion would not be required and the community traditions,
which were thought to be vital to a democratic style of govern-
ment, would be preserved.
Congress incorporated the second plan in its adoption of the
113. See supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text.
114. The Continental Army plan called for "a small, highly trained, highly effective
Regular Army, which could be expanded in wartime with the 'Federal Volunteers' who
would be raised, officered, and trained in time of peace." E. LEE, supra note 20, at 35.
115. The Secretary held a dim view of the present system under which the federal
government relied upon the National Guard. "Until we entirely abandon the idea of relying
upon the impossible system of State troops for national defense, we can never build a sys-
tem on any foundation that will endure or that will stand the strain of war." Id. at 36.
"The best I think you can expect is to have them come forward to supply wastage. .. ."
Id. (emphasis in original). The Continental Army plan would therefore "leave the National
Guard for purely State uses." Id. at 35.
116. Id. at 37. See also supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
117. E. LEE, supra note 20, at 43. The National Guard's Adjutant General Chase, of
Colorado, used the following plea to implore the committee not to select the Contintental
Army plan: "We yearn with our whole souls for an opportunity to federalize. You can
federalize us to any extent or do anything else on earth to make the National Guard an
asset for the protection of the country, but I know that the Guard is fit." Id. at 67-68. The
problems inherent in "federalizing" the National Guard arose due to the obstacles planted
in the text of the Constitution. See supra notes 59-70 and accompanying text (federal
access to the militia is bounded by the constitutional "call" provisions; federal government




National Defense Act of 1916.118 This legislative scheme required
an intermingling and blending of both the army and militia power,
ultimately giving rise to the issue at stake in the Perpich case.
The heart of the Act, section 111, provided that the President
could implement a draft compelling "any or all members of the
National Guard""19 to serve in the United States Army (under the
army power).' 2  This selective draft could be utilized whenever
Congress "authorized the use of the armed land forces of the
United States, for any purpose requiring the use of troops in ex-
cess of those [accessible in] the Regular Army."''
The problem'with this provision was that it failed to recog-
nize the states' right to maintain a militia force, a right secured
by the adoption of the second amendment. 22 The necessities of a
"well regulated" militia would seemingly require that the federal
government permit men, as well as guns, to comprise the state
militia. A federal draft of "any or all" members of the state's Na-
tional Guard would eliminate that state's militia force. If federal
respect for state militia forces is constitutionally mandated, then
National Guard service must shield National Guardsmen from
compelled service in the United States Army under certain cir-
cumstances. A federal draft under the army power which ran-
domly selects citizens, including National Guardsmen, for federal
service in the army would be quite another matter.'23 Similarly, a
118. National Defense Act, ch. 134, 39 Stat. 166 (1916)(codified as amended in
scattered sections of 10 & 32 U.S.C.).
119. National Defense Act, ch. 134, § 111, 39 Stat. 166 (1916), repealed by Act of
Aug. 10, 1956, ch. 1041, § 2, 70A Stat. 596.
120. The Supreme Court has held that Congress' army power carries with it the
implied power to institute a draft to compel military service. Selective Draft Law Cases,
245 U.S. 366, 377 (1918). "As the mind cannot conceive an army without men to compose
it, . . . the objection that [the Constitution] . . . does not give power to provide for such
men would seem to be too frivolous for further notice." Id.
121. National Defense Act, ch. 134, § 111, 39 Stat. 166 (1916), repealed by Act of
Aug. 10, 1956, ch. 1041, § 2, 70A Stat. 596.
122. See supra notes 44-58 and accompanying text.
123. A draft structured in this fashion would be true to the claim that Congress may
draft any of its citizens. As written, § 11 drafted only those citizens who happened also to
be National Guardsmen. This meant that Congress was setting aside the majority of the
population as immune from the draft (discounting for the moment the probability that
Congress might enact a separate draft statute reaching all remaining citizens once the
supply of National Guardsmen was exhausted). Thus, the statute operated to prevent Con-
gress from drafting "any of its citizens." The rationale underpinning § 111 was that the
"draft into the Army of the United States [was] operative upon the members of the militia,
not in their status as militiamen, but in their capacity as citizens .... Ansell, supra note
110, at 714. In truth, the draft was operative upon the members of the militia in their
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different issue would be presented if the federal draft selectively
targeted National Guardsmen only when actual war or other na-
tional emergencies seemed imminent. 2 Such compelling circum-
stances would permit federal interests to justifiably override state
militia rights.
The Act contained one further encroachment upon the Con-
stitutional militia powers granted to the states, in that the states
were constrained to appoint only those officers who "passed such
tests as to . . . physical, moral, and professional fitness as the
President shall prescribe."'1 2 5 This limited "[t]he constitutional
provision 'reserving to the states . . . the Appointment of the Of-
ficers' .... 1,126 The State Governors' discretion in appointing the
officers of the National Guard was thus narrowed dramatically.
This new statutory rule was not without its benefits. Federal over-
sight could be used to prevent the Governors from using their ap-
pointment power to turn political cronies into generals, thus elimi-
nating one of the historical causes of militia ineptitude.121
Nevertheless, to permit Congress to invade the Governors' ap-
pointment power in this fashion was to do violence to the separa-
tion of power between state and federal governments over the mi-
litia, which was fashioned so carefully in the text of the
Constitution.'28 Reliance by the federal government on the state
militia carried with it the cost of shared control between the fed-
eral and respective state governments. This tradeoff involving the
appointment power was created during the compromise process
capacity as citizens because of their status as militiamen.
124. In time of war the country calls forth its citizens to ensure national survival.
The citizen "may be compelled .... against his will and without regard to his personal
wishes. . . to take his place in the ranks of the army of his country and risk the chance of
being shot down in its defense." Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 29 (1904). It
would be anomalous to shield the National Guardsmen from this requirement while send-
ing his neighbor off to combat. Additionally, the National Guard troops would be better
prepared for service in the Army. Their military training, much of it at federal expense,
better equips them to serve than their untrained neighbor. Accordingly, they should be
drafted first when war is threatened because "Congress not only has the right to take those
who are the best prepared to defend the Nation, but it also has the duty." Ansell, supra
note 110, at 723.
125. National Defense Act, ch. 134, §§ 74-75, 39 Stat. 166 (1916)(codified as
amended at 32 U.S.C. §§ 305, 307, 323 and 10 U.S.C. §§ 3820 & 8820 (1986)).
126. Wiener, supra note 25, at 201; see also supra note 67 and accompanying text.
127. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.




which grew out of the constitutional clash of Anti-Federalist129
and Federalist 3" forces. They presumably had weighed the bene-
fits of federal oversight in the appointment process, including the
risk of political generals, but chose to vest plenary appointment
power in the Governors.
The National Defense Act of 1916 was significant in two re-
spects. First, it signaled a shift in national defense policy from one
bottomed on local control to one controlled by the central govern-
ment. Second, it provided the first example of statutory blending
of the army and militia powers. This was the beginning of what
became a creeping erosion of the bright line separating the militia
and army powers. These are the two issues upon which the
Perpich litigation turns.
E. The Act of 1933
Following World War I, Congress concentrated unprece-
dented authority in the central government by allowing, for the
first time ever, a standing army in peacetime.13 1 In addition, plan-
ners decided that efficient use of this new resource required that
all land forces in the service of the United States, including the
National Guard, shed their distinctive identities by incorporating
themselves full-time into the army (the "One Army" idea).132
This created a problem, however, because the National Defense
Act of 1916 brought the National Guard into the army only when
"called" into federal service under the militia clause and during
those additional periods when the President drafted National
Guardsmen into the army under the army clause pursuant to Con-
gressional authorization. 33 The Act of 1933134 was adopted, in
part, to establish the National Guard as a full-time branch of the
army. The Act accomplished this by making the National Guard
a reserve component of the United States Army 35 designating it
129. See supra notes 23-30 and accompanying text.
130. See supra notes 31-38 and accompanying text.
131. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
132. Wiener, supra note 25, at 207.
133. National Defense Act, ch. 134, § 111, 39 Stat. 166 (1916), repealed by Act of
Aug. 10, 1956, ch. 1041, § 2, 70A Stat. 596.
134. Act of June 15, 1933, ch. 87, 48 Stat. 153 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 10 & 32 U.S.C.).
135. Id. § 9 (amending the National Defense Act by adding § 71(b))(current version
at 32 U.S.C. § 101(3)-(5) (1986)).
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the National Guard of the United States. 13 6 This new "National
Guard of the United States" subsumed those troops already serv-
ing in the National Guard units of the several states.13 7 Thus, a
member of the State National Guard inherited automatic mem-
bership in the United States Army Reserves.
Since the federal army power is plenary and this new provi-
sion, by definition, brought all National Guardsmen within the
ambit of the army power, the federal government had put in place
a mechanism by which it could utilize State National Guard
troops without regard to the constitutional militia clause restric-
tions. The statute, however, declined to go so far. Without men-
tioning militia clause restrictions, it permitted the President to
bring the National Guard of the United States onto active duty
only if Congress first "declared a national emergency . . . requir-
ing the use of troops in excess of those of the Regular Army. 138
By placing the "national emergency" restriction upon the federal
government's application of its army powers to the National
Guard, the draftsmen properly accommodated the states' militia
rights granted to them under the militia clause and the second
amendment.139
The only substantive change brought about by the Act of
1933 was that all National Guard troops were made a part of the
Army Reserves at all times. In practice, however, the operation of
the National Guard was changed little. Though defined as a part
of the reserve armed forces of the United States, the Act did not
treat the National Guard as such. The constitutional "call" provi-
sions limiting federal access to National Guard assets as well as
conditioning the army power upon a Congressional declaration of
"national emergency" effectively left the National Guard separate
from the other reserve forces. Semantics, however, were responsi-
ble for a further blending of the militia and army powers.
F. The Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952
The Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952140 has survived to the
136. Id. § I (current version at 32 U.S.C. § 101(3)-(5) (1986)).
137. Id. § 9 (amending the National Defense Act by adding § 71(a))(current version
at 32 U.S.C. § 101(3)-(5) (1986)).
138. Id. § 18 (amending § 111 of the National Defense Act).
139. See supra notes 122-124 and accompanying text.
140. Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952, ch. 608, 66 Stat. 481, repealed in part by
Act of Aug. 10, 1956, ch. 1041, § 53, 70A Stat. 641.
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present day with only minor modifications. Its declared purpose
was not to alter the existing distribution of power between the fed-
eral and state governments over the National Guard (as it then
existed under the Act of 1933). Rather, its purpose was to "bring
together . . . in one statute the great number of laws relating to
the reserve components of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine
Corps, and Coast Guard, which have been enacted during past
decades."""1 The National Guard was included because of its con-
tinued role as a reserve component of the United States Army.142
As in the Act of 1933, the Act of 1952 allowed federal access to
the National Guard, under the army clause, in times of "national
emergency." 14
3
Section 233 of this Act, however, differed markedly from the
statutory forerunners. This section, for the first time, used army
clause powers to bring National Guardsmen into active federal
service for training.144 Because legislative history relating to this
new feature is nonexistent,145 we must assume that it was adopted
141. S. REP. No. 1795, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1952 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 2005.
142. Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952, ch. 608, § 202, 66 Stat. 481, repealed by
Act of Aug. 10, 1956, ch. 1041, § 53, 70A Stat. 641, 682 (current version at 10 U.S.C. §8
261-63, 267, 3221, 3224, 8221, 8224 (1986), 14 U.S.C. § 752(a)(1986), and 32 U.S.C. §8
101-02 (1986)).
143. Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952, ch. 608, § 233(a), 66 Stat. 481, repealed
by Act of Aug. 10, 1956, ch. 1041, § 53, 70A Stat. 641, 682. Previous statutes allowed
federal access to National Guardsmen under the army clause only when the services of the
Guard were needed due to a "national emergency." See Act of June 15, 1933, ch. 87, § 18,
48 Stat. 153 (amending National Defense Act, cl. 134, § 111, 39 Stat. 166 (1916)).
144. Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952, ch. 608, § 233(c), 66 Stat. 481, repealed
by Act of Aug. 10, 1956, ch. 1041, § 53, 70A Stat. 641, 682 (current version at 10 U.S.C.
§ 672(b)(1986))(providing that members of all reserve components may be ordered to ac-
tive duty for training, not to exceed fifteen days annually - but specifying that National
Guardsmen were vulnerable to the federal training requirements only if their Governor
consented).
145. Representatives from the National Guard who appeared before the Senate sub-
committee which considered this legislation did not mention the new training provision
contained in § 233. Instead, they used their testimony to emphasize the need for compul-
sory military service in the National Guard. Under the volunteer system, they claimed that
manning levels stood at about 50% due to an annual turnover of one third of their person-
nel. Thus, National Guard commanders were unable to adequately train their troops be-
cause the demands of recruiting were draining assets and resources. Perhaps the federal
training provision was a compromise. The National Guard did not get the draft it sought,
however, the training problems would be alleviated by having the federal government fulfill
this function. See Armed Forces Reserve Act: Hearings on H.R. 5426 Before the Senate
Subcomm. on Armed Services, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 104, 111-12, 114, & 131 (1952). Cf.
Perpich v. United States Dep't of Defense, 666 F. Supp. 1319 (D. Minn. 1987), appeal
filed, No. 87-5345-MN (8th Cir. Aug. 12, 1987)("Congress enacted these provisions in
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for one of two reasons. It was either adopted because Congress
thought it was merely enacting "into law policies which [were al-
ready] . . . being carried out administratively,"146 or because
Congress felt the new law merely preserved the National Guard's
"traditional place in our defense structure. 1 47
This new federal role in the management of National Guard
troops is significant for two reasons. First, it further demonstrates
the pervasive application of the army clause (as expanded by the
necessary and proper powers) to the National Guard. Second, and
perhaps more important, it shows a continuing erosion of the state
powers granted under the militia clause. With this expansion of
federal power, the states lost much of their authority to train "the
Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress. '"148 An
awareness of this problem, although articulated nowhere within
the statute, can be implied from the special treatment accorded
National Guardsmen and their respective State Governors when-
ever training was desired by federal officials. Section 233 required
gubernatorial consent before National Guardsmen could be or-
dered onto active duty for peace time training. 149 No such consent
requirement was imposed in the case of other reservists - Army,
Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard.
National Guard officials, ever anxious for an expanded fed-
eral role,1 50 probably encouraged this new concept. Federal train-
ing would lead naturally to an increasingly important role for the
National Guard within national defense strategy. The numerous
Governors were similarly loathe to challenge the federal training
programs because their states enjoyed perpetual access to a feder-
ally subsidized National Guard force.151 During fiscal year 1985,
for instance, forty-eight Governors called upon their National
Guard troops on 614 separate occasions. These requests came in
response to objections from state National Guard officials who sought to limit the scope of
the federalization of the National Guard in part on constitutional grounds.").
146. S. REP. No. 1795, supra note 141, at 2005.
147. Id. at 2015.
148. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
149. See supra note 144.
150. See supra note 109; see also supra note 117 (remarks of Adjutant General
Chase).
151. "[T]he federal government accounts for more than 90 percent of overall Guard
funding .. " Kitfield, Who Controls the Guard?, MILITARY LOGIsTICs FORUM, Oct.
1986, at 52, 57. Accord Montgomery, supra note 11, at Al0, col. 3 (Representative Mont-
gomery observes that "the federal government provides almost 100 percent of National
Guard funding .... ").
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response to emergencies such as blizzards, floods, tornadoes, forest
fires, chemical spills, housing of the homeless, and search and res-
cue missions. Almost 21,000 guardsmen responded, providing in
excess of 124,561 workdays for their respective states. Federal na-
tional guard appropriations defrayed the overall cost of this ser-
vice thus reducing the combined fifty state outlay to only eight
million dollars of the total expense.152 The Governors paid a mere
sixty-four dollars per workday - an incredible bargain since the
Guardsman is available any time of day or night and is fully
trained and equipped to respond to virtually any civil emergency
that might arise.53
Finally, this federal training provision did not result in any
meaningful loss of state power. If a Governor preferred to train
his National Guard troops within his state, he could simply with-
hold his consent. However, it was unlikely that many Governors
would exercise this prerogative since the federal training periods
increased the expertise of their guardsmen at no cost to the state.
The federal/state split in authority over the National Guard
which was struck by the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952 re-
mained essentially untouched until the Montgomery Amendment,
which removed the gubernatorial consent provision contained in
section 233, was added to that legislation in 1986.
III. JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENTS
The United States Supreme Court perceives judicial author-
ity to be quite limited in the area of national defense and military
affairs.1 54 An intrusive posture is avoided because "judges are not
given the task of running the Army. 1 1 55 Consistent with this view,
the Court has left issues relating to the army and the militia to
152. Department of Defense Appropriations for 1987: Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on the Dep't of Defense of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 99th Cong., 2d
Sess. 625-26 (1986)(statement of Lieutenant General Emmett H. Walker, Jr., U.S. Army,
Chief, National Guard Bureau).
153. But see NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DIsORDERs, supra note 90,
at 275 (criticizing National Guard effectiveness in the accomplishment of its state role
during the civil riots of 1963-67).
154. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 64-65 (1981)("The case arises in the context
of Congress' authority over national defense and military affairs, and perhaps in no other
area has the Court accorded Congress greater deference.").
155. Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 93 (1953). See also Gilligan v. Morgan, 413
U.S. 1, 10 (1973)(the courts should avoid judicial review of the government's military deci-
sions because this was "the intent of the Constitution" and the courts have little "compe-
tence" on the subject).
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Congress. 156 Most constitutional challenges to the statutes enacted
by Congress have been rejected, 157 leaving for the Court only mat-
ters of statutory interpretation.
Handicapped by the Court's reluctance to closely examine
the army power, this section nevertheless undertakes to measure
the breadth of that power. The ultimate issue, however, is not
whether the army power is subject to limit - but whether the
state militia power may properly serve as one such limit. This sec-
tion concludes with an analysis of that question.
A. Cases Supporting an Expansive Interpretation of the Army
Power
Of the many cases offering an expansive interpretation of the
power to raise and support armies, two are offered herein - Ex
Parte Dostal 58 and the Selective Draft Law Cases.15 9
The Dostal litigation was brought by John Hackenberg, an
Austrian immigrant who enlisted in the Ohio National Guard by
falsifying his citizenship and age. Two weeks after passage of the
1916 National Defense Act, the President drafted Hackenberg's
National Guard unit into the United States Army for service on
the Mexican border pursuant to section 111 of that Act. 6' Hack-
enberg was discharged along with his unit nine months later.
However, four months after his discharge, Hackenberg's entire
unit was drafted once again for federal service. This recall onto
active duty was premised not on section 111 of the 1916 National
Defense Act, but rather, on provisions contained within the Selec-
tive Draft Law.1 6' A federal draft under section 111 would target
only National Guardsmen while a federal draft under the Selec-
tive Draft Law would encompass all citizens. Hackenberg chal-
lenged the legitimacy of the Selective Draft Law. He argued that
he could not be made to occupy the status of soldier against his
will. The court summarily rejected this claim, observing that Con-
156. See supra notes 75-153 and accompanying text (demonstrating the pervasive
degree of Congressional activity).
157. See infra notes 158-94 and accompanying text.
158. 243 F. 664 (N.D. Ohio 1917).
159. 245 U.S. 366 (1918).
160. See supra notes 119-21 and accompanying text (explaining how § Ill of the
1916 Defense Act operates).
161. Act of May 18, 1917, ch. 15, 40 Stat. 76 eliminated by Act of June 15, 1917, §
4, 40 Stat. 217 (specifying that the Act of May 18, 1917 was to expire within four months
after the conclusion of World War I).
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gress' power to raise armies and to provide for the common de-
fense of the country is "practically unlimited. '16 2  Therefore,
"[a]ny contention that compulsory service is in violation of the
Constitution is utterly frivolous." 163
The Selective Draft Law Cases'64 were decided by the Su-
preme Court four months later. Faced with constitutional chal-
lenges to the same Selective Draft Law, the court agreed with
Dostal. It reasoned that the army powers contained "complete au-
thority" in the realm of national defense. 6 On the strength of
this case it is now settled law that the army power, combined with
the necessary and proper power, authorizes the existence of a
compulsory draft statute."6
B. Cases Suggesting That the Army Power, Though Broad, Is
Not Limitless
Congress is not "free to disregard the Constitution when it
acts in the area of military affairs.1 67 Application of this princi-
ple has served to circumscribe the breadth of the army power in a
variety of contexts.
The courts first applied this principle when a Civil War era
draft statute' was challenged in 1863. The statute provided that
all able bodied males were liable to military service in the United
States Army if called upon by the President.169 In Antrim's
Case,170 the district court recognized, consistent with Dostal and
162. Ex Parte Dostal, 243 F. at 675.
163. Id.
164. 245 U.S. 366 (1918).
165. Id. at 382.
166. The court stated:
[Authority to enact a compulsory draft statute] must be found in the clauses of
the Constitution giving Congress power "to declare war. . . to raise and support
armies . . . to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and
naval forces." Article I, § 8. And of course the powers conferred by these provi-
sions like all other powers given carry with them as provided by the Constitution
the authority "to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying
into execution the foregoing powers." Article I, § 8. As the mind cannot conceive
an army without the men to compose it . . .the objection that it does not give
power to provide for such men would seem to be too frivolous for further notice.
Id. at 377.
167. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 67 (1981).
168. Act of March 3, 1863, ch. 75, 12 Stat. 731.
169. Id. § 1.
170. 1 F. Cas. 1062 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1863)(No. 495). See also Shaw, supra note 6, at
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the Selective Draft Law Cases, that the constitutional power to
raise and support armies allowed the national government to draft
private persons into military service. The court held, however, that
this power was not without limit because situations exist where it
might encroach upon constitutional principles. The court recog-
nized that preservation of our republican form of government was
one such principle.1 71 To prevent encroachment on the offices of
government, certain governmental officials must be immune from
the reach of the draft statute. Under the statute in question in
Antrim's Case the Vice-President of the United States, judges,
heads of the departments of government, and Governors of the
several states were exempt from the draft.1 72 The court further
determined that any draft statute must contain limitations upon
the duration of service required of draftees - the statute involved
in Antrim's Case provided for a term of two years.177 The court
reasoned that these two safeguards were needed in order to ensure
that a military government would have no opportunity to wrest
power from the established republican government. 74
The religious guarantees of the first amendment175 have also
been held to impose limits upon Congress in exercising its army
power. This issue arose when two conscripts challenged a Viet
Nam era draft law176 in Gillette v. United States.1 77 Although it
upheld the statute, the Court specified that the army power must
accommodate the establishment clause of the first amendment. 7 8
Additionally, the Court determined that the statute would have
overreached the bounds of the army power if the burdens imposed
on the free exercise clause of the first amendment had been more
than "incidental. ' '17 9
171. Presumably the court's authority for this principle was the Republican Govern-
ment clause. U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 4 ("The United States shall guarantee to every State
in this Union a Republican Form of Government .... ").
172. Act of March 3, 1863, ch. 75, § 2, 12 Stat. 731.
173. Id. § 11.
174. 1 F. Cas. at 1064.
175. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohib-
iting the free exercise thereof .... " U.S. CoNsr. amend. I.
176. Military Selective Service Act of 1948, § 6(j), 50 U.S.C. app. § 4560)
(1986)(The Act, although adopted in 1948 and amended a number of times, still retained
its original name.).
177. 401 U.S. 437 (1971).
178. For the statute to survive analysis under the Establishment Clause "there must
be neutral, secular reasons to justify the line that Congress has drawn . Id. at 449
n.14.
179. Id. at 462 ("The incidental burdens felt by persons in petitioners' position are
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In United States v. O'Brien"80 the Supreme Court examined
the interplay between the first amendment's guarantee of free
speech""l and the army power. In defiance of a federal statute
which prohibited destruction of Selective Service cards,182 David
O'Brien burned his Selective Service card before a crowd of peo-
ple near the South Boston courthouse.18 s The Supreme Court up-
held O'Brien's conviction under the statute only after a satisfac-
tory showing by the government that the army power had
successfully accommodated first amendment free speech values. In
striking the balance between these two constitutional provisions,
the Court circumscribed the statutory use of the army power to
those situations which further an "important ...governmental
interest" 4 and place only an "incidental restriction on . . .First
Amendment freedoms."18 5
The Court has, in addition, required Congress to use the
army power in a manner consistent with the equal protection
guarantees of the fifth amendment. 8  In Rostker v. Goldberg,18 7
the Supreme Court passed on the constitutionality of the Military
Selective Service Act which authorized the President to register
men for the draft, but not women.1 88 President Carter had sug-
gested that Congress amend the statute to include women.189 Af-
ter considering the President's proposal "at great length" 190 Con-
gress refused to extend the statute's coverage to include both
sexes. The statute was subsequently challenged in the Supreme
Court on the theory that it amounted to "unlawful gender-based
strictly justified by substantial governmental interests .
180. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
181. "Congress shall make no law. . . abridging the freedom of speech . U.S.
CoNsT. amend. I.
182. Military Selective Service Act of 1948, § 12, 50 U.S.C. app. § 462(b)(3)
(1986)(section (b)(3) was added to the Act in 1965 by an Act of Aug. 30, 1965, Pub. L.
No. 89-152, 79 Stat. 586).
183. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 369.
184. Id. at 377.
185. Id.
186. The fifth amendment does not contain an Equal Protection clause. The Court
has, through the doctrine of "reverse incorporation," implied into the fifth amendment the
fourteenth amendment's Equal Protection provision. See, e.g., Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S.
497 (1954).
187. 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
188. Military Selective Service Act of 1948, § 3, 50 U.S.C. app. § 453 (1986).
189. 453 U.S. at 60.
190. Id. at 61.
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discrimination."' 191 The Court upheld the statute but acknowl-
edged that the army power could not be used in a manner incon-
sistent with the "test of Craig v. Boren."' 92 Because the statute
used a gender based classification scheme, use of the army power
would have been impermissible had it not furthered an "important
governmental interest."' 9
The underlying rationale of these cases19 4 is that Congress is
checked in its ability to legislate under the army power by those
specific guarantees found elsewhere within the Constitution. Fur-
ther support for this principle is found in Supreme Court cases
which explicitly recognize limitations on other constitutional pow-
ers closely analogous to the army power.
The war power is closely related to the army power.' 95 In
Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries,'96 the Supreme Court held
that the war power was not plenary. Instead, the court declared
that "[the war power of the United States, like its other powers
• . . is subject to applicable constitutional limitations."'9
This principle was also applied by the Supreme Court to limit
the federal government's use of the war power in Ex Parte Milli-
gan. 98 During the Civil War, the general in command of union
forces in Indiana caused a civilian resident of that state to face
charges before a military tribunal instead of the local federal dis-
trict court. The government sought to justify this conduct by argu-
ing that "in a time of war the commander of an armed force...
has the power . . . to suspend all civil rights."'' 99 The Supreme
Court rejected this claim and overturned the lower court's convic-
tion. The Court held that the war power did not justify abridg-
ment of the defendant's fourth, fifth and sixth amendment
rights. 00
191. Id. at 62.
192. Id. at 70.
193. Id.
194. See supra notes 167-93 and accompanying text.
195. The term "war power" is used by the court to refer to the collection of various
military powers found in article I, § 8 and article II, § 2 of the Constitution. The war
power therefore encompasses the army power along with several other enumerated military
powers. See Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 758 (1948)(framing the issue to be
whether a statute was a law necessary and proper for implementing "the war powers of
Congress and especially its power to support armies").
196. 251 U.S. 146 (1919).
197. Id. at 156.
198. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
199. Id. at 124.
200. Id. at 118-31. But see Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 758 (1948)(im-
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Closely related to the army power is the congressional power
found in article I, section 8, clause 14 of the Constitution. This
passage empowers Congress to "make Rules for the Government
and Regulation of the land and naval Forces." In Reid v. Cov-
ert,201 the Supreme Court held that this power is not plenary. The
case arose when the civilian wife of a United States serviceman
was accused of his murder. Since the couple was posted to an
overseas duty assignment, the government sought to bring the wife
to trial before a military court martial instead of returning her to
the United States for trial. The government argued that "the Nec-
essary and Proper Clause when taken in conjunction with Clause
14 allows Congress to authorize the trial of [the wife] . ..by
military tribunals and under military law. '20 2 The Court recog-
nized that the government's theory would clash with the wife's
constitutional rights under "Article III and the Fifth, Sixth and
Eighth Amendments. 203 Accordingly, the government's theory
failed because it ran counter to "the steadfast bulwark of the Bill
of Rights."2 4
Taken together, the army power, the war power, and the mil-
itary rules power cases demonstrate that the army power is not
plenary. Instead, it must be exercised in harmony with other con-
stitutional guarantees. What remains to be decided is the issue
presented by the Perpich case. The Court must decide what limi-
tations, if any, the state militia power imposes upon the federal
army power.
C. Cases Examining the Interplay Between the Militia and
Army Powers
The Supreme Court had no reason to address this question
prior to 1916 because, until that time, Congress had not intermin-
plying that the war power is limitless because "[ilt is impossible. . . to picture adequately
all that might have been 'necessary and proper' in 1942-1944 to meet the unprecedented
responsibility facing Congress"); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 217-18
(1944)(holding that "the war power of Congress and the Executive [permits them to ex-
clude] those of Japanese ancestry from the West Coast war area"); Schenck v. United
States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919)(holding that the war power can override first amendment
rights).
201. 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
202. Id. at 20.
203. Id. at 21.
204. Id. Accord Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955).
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gled the army and militia powers. °5 Between the passage of the
Militia Act of 1792 and the passage of the National Defense Act
of 1916, Congress exercised its powers under the militia and army
clauses in a manner which maintained the separateness of their
two identities.208
Contrary to the thesis of this Note, no case directly holds
that the state militia power limits the army power. Indeed, Ex
Parte Dostal01 and the Selective Draft Law Cases208 are cited as
authority for the proposition that the state militia power cannot
constrain the army power. A closer analysis of these two cases,
however, reveals room for interpretive differences.
In Ex Parte Dostal, the court was confronted with a chal-
lenge to the Selective Draft Law enacted pursuant to the army
power. It swept this challenge aside but, in dicta, addressed the
relationship between the army and militia powers by assessing the
constitutionality of the federal draft provision contained in section
111 of the 1916 National Defense Act. The court observed that a
draft which targets National Guardsmen is permissible in view of
the existing emergency.209 Neither the statutes involved nor the
analysis offered by the court suggested that a preferential draft
taking National Guardsmen before other available citizens would
be permissible absent a "national emergency." The resulting infer-
ence is that the army powers would not enjoy such a broad appli-
cation but for the compelling circumstance of a "national emer-
gency." Though offered as an army power case, the influence of
the war power line of cases is apparent. 10
205. But see the numerous cases litigated in the Confederate States of America dur-
ing the Civil War. These cases analyzed the constitutionality (under the Confederate Con-
stitution) of various Confederate draft statutes. Certain southern states objected on the
ground that these statutes interfered with their militia rights. The Confederate courts uni-
formly held that the state militia power must yield to the army power. These cases are
collected and analyzed in Shaw, supra note 6, at 61-62. See also Selective Draft Law
Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 388 (1918)("The seceding States wrote into the constitution which
was adopted to regulate the government which they sought to establish, in identical word9
the provisions of the Constitution of the United States which we here have under
consideration.").
206. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
207. 243 F. 664 (N.D. Ohio 1917). See also supra notes 158, 160-63 and accompa-
nying text.
208. 245 U.S. 366 (1918).
209. 243 F. at 674.




The Selective Draft Law Cases211 are the leading authority
for the rule that the militia powers cannot inhibit the army pow-
ers. There, the defendants argued that the Constitution required
the use of an army comprised of non-consenting citizens to be lim-
ited to those services for which the militia may be used.2"2 The
Court dismissed this argument, holding instead that the militia
and army clauses are wholly distinct and that the militia clause
does not constrain the army clause. Furthermore, the Court rea-
soned that the states' control of the militia exists only to the ex-
tent that such control is "not taken away by the exercise by Con-
gress of its power to raise armies. ' 213 As strong as this language
may seem, blind reliance upon the case for such a sweeping prin-
ciple is ill-founded for several reasons.
First, the Court premised its conclusion regarding the interre-
lationship between the army and militia powers upon article I,
section 10 of the Constitution. This provision conferred on Con-
gress the power to deny the states the right to keep troops in time
of peace.21 4 Since Congress could deny states the right to maintain
a militia altogether, the Court reasoned that the states' Constitu-
tional militia powers were but mere privileges which could not im-
pact the central government's army power. This argument, how-
ever, fails to recognize that there is more in the Constitution than
article I, section 10. Adoption of the second amendment modified
article I, section 10, so that maintaining militia troops by the
states was thereafter permitted as a matter of right.215 Because
the Court failed to recognize that the second amendment repealed
the consent provision of article I, section 10, its conclusion is
suspect.
Second, the case was decided in the midst of World War I. It
might even be more properly classified as a war power case, which
would make its rule inapplicable to the Perpich army power litiga-
tion. Nevertheless, the wartime setting was especially conducive to
211. 245 U.S. 366 (1918). See also supra notes 159, 164-66 and accompanying text.
212. 245 U.S. at 381-82.
213. Id. at 383.
214.
In supplying the [army] power it was manifestly intended to give it all and leave
none to the States, since besides the delegation to Congress of authority to raise
armies the Constitution prohibited the States, without the consent of Congress,
from keeping troops in time of peace or engaging in war.
245 U.S. at 381. See also supra note 50 and accompanying text.
215. See supra notes 44-58 and accompanying text.
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broad assertions regarding Congressional exercise of its army
powers because the country's survival was at risk." 6 Thus, the
Court, perhaps prudently, declined to provide a rationale implying
limitation of any kind on the army powers. The Court, however,
has not always accorded such deferential treatment to the army
power. Numerous Supreme Court cases support the proposition
that the army powers are not plenary and may be subject to the
limitations posed by other constitutionally enumerated powers.2"7
Finally, the relationship between the militia and army powers
was an issue that was, at best, tangential to the cause of action
before the Court. Central to the case was the defendant's frontal
assault upon the draft statute premised mainly upon the notion
that the federal government was without the power to compel mil-
itary service of its citizens. It was claimed that the power to draft
was not expressly granted and could not be implied and that com-
pelled service was contrary to notions of individual liberty. This
argument comprised the substance of the defendant's claim. He
next made a host of throw away arguments,21 8 including the
claim 19 which prompted the Court's oft-cited rule regarding the
relationship between the militia and army powers.220 The Court
could easily have disregarded this argument on the ground that it
was wholly unsupportable. In addressing the issue, no rigorous
analysis by the Court was necessary. Any possibility of rigorous
analysis was made even more difficult because of the lack of pre-
cedent.22' Thus, the Court's reasoning included only a cursory ex-
amination of the plain language contained in the army and the
militia passages of the Constitution. Accordingly, the Court's rul-
ing that the militia powers cannot limit the army powers is weak-
ened because the issue was not focused upon fully. A truly disposi-
tive ruling which would merit application beyond the precise facts
before that Court would be impossible absent fuller analysis.
216. See war power cases cited supra notes 195-200 and accompanying text.
217. See supra notes 167-94 and accompanying text.
218. The defendant claimed that the statute was void because, inter alia, it delegated
federal power to state officials, it violated separation of powers by vesting both administra-
tive and judicial officers with legislative discretion and it violated the religious establish-
ment, free speech, and involuntary servitude clauses of the Constitution. Selective Draft
Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 389-90 (1918).
219. See supra text accompanying note 212.
220. See supra text accompanying note 213.
221. See supra note 205 and accompanying text. The court utilized precedents de-




It would overstate the holdings of these two cases to suggest
that the army power is plenary. Instead, the army power must be
amenable to limitation where its exercise contravenes explicit con-
stitutional guarantees. The states' right to maintain militia forces
should be one such guarantee. The facts of the Perpich case offer
the court the opportunity to finally resolve this constitutional
conflict.
IV. THE PERPICH LITIGATION
A. Background in Which the Case Arose
The necessity for federal training of Governor Perpich's Na-
tional Guardsmen would never have arisen if federal reliance upon
the National Guard had been discarded entirely.22 Although the
role in national defense policy reserved for the National Guard
had fluctuated over the years, elimination of the unpopular draft,
which accompanied the end of the Viet Nam conflict, required a
"massive and fundamental transformation"22 3 in the orientation of
the United States' defense policy. The Total Force Policy was en-
acted in 1973224 to compensate for the inevitable loss of military
manpower which would accompany the end of the draft. 25 Under
the new doctrine, military readiness would be maintained by mak-
ing the National Guard and other reserve forces an integral part
of the active armed forces.226
The role played by the National Guard was on the rise. By
1986, forty-five percent of the United States Army's combat units
were provided by the National Guard.227 Thus, if the United
222. This approach was first suggested by Secretary of War Garrison in 1916. See
supra notes 114-16 and accompanying text. Federal reliance upon the National Guard was
diminished in favor of a standing army at the close of World War I. See supra note 83.
223. Philbin, States' Rights, NATIONAL GUARD, April, 1987, at 21, 23.
224. Id.
225. Glickman, supra note 11, at 4, col. 3.
226. Id. See also MacFarlane v. Grasso, 696 F.2d 217, 222 (2d Cir. 1982).
227. Department of Defense Appropriations for 1987: Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on the Dep't of Defense of the House Comm. on Appropriations, supra note 152, at
626. See also Burrelli, National Guard Overseas Training Missions: An Issue For U.S.
Military Manpower Policy, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT No. 86-181 F,
at 9 (Dec. 1, 1986)(One hundred percent of the TOW light anti-tank infantry battallions,
infantry scout troops and heavy helicopter companies are provided to the U.S. Army by the
National Guard); Perpich v. United States Dep't of Defense, 666 F. Supp. 1319 (D. Minn.
1987), appealfiled, No. 87-5345-MN (8th Cir. Aug. 12, 1987)(seventy five percent of the
army divisions available in the event of war would be provided, at least in part, by the
National Guard).
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States were to go to war, "nearly half of the troops available for
combat duty in the Army would come from the National
Guard. 22 8 Such a policy would be doomed to failure if the Na-
tional Guard troops were not properly trained. Since the army
would undoubtedly be deployed to overseas locations during war-
time, actual overseas training for National Guardsmen was seen
as indispensable. 229 This reasoning caused overseas training of
National Guardsmen to grow explosively in the 1980's.2a° In 1985
and 1986, the entire overseas training program was threatened
when certain Governors decided to exercise their gubernatorial
veto power, provided for in section 233(c) of the Armed Forces
Reserve Act of 1952.231
Congress had three options at its disposal with which to re-
spond, short of amending the consent provision out of the statute.
First, participation of the National Guard in the overall defense
scheme could be eliminated so that the foregone training opportu-
nities would be of little consequence to the federal government.23 2
Implementation of this particular approach would entail ex-
panding the army so that it alone could provide for the nation's
defense. This could be accomplished by re-instituting the draft or
by making a career in the armed services more attractive so that
sufficient numbers of volunteers would fill the ranks. A second op-
tion would be to limit National Guard participation in the na-
tional defense strategy to only those National Guard units resid-
ing in states that could be relied upon to cooperate. Under this
approach, overseas training opportunities would only be provided
for those guardsmen located in cooperative states. The third ap-
proach would involve freezing the National Guard federal subsidy
funds and making release of them to the states contingent upon
gubernatorial cooperation..2 3 The final, and most effective solution
228. Glickman, supra note 11, at 4, col. 3.
229. "Situations arise in actual overseas deployments that simply can not be repli-
cated." Burrelli, supra note 227, at 13.
230. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
231. See supra note 144; see generally notes 144-53 and accompanying text.
232. This option was proposed by the Secretary of War as far back as 1916. See
supra note 222.
233. This option held a particularly high probability of success from the federal van-
tage point. It amounted to nothing more than using the tremendous federal subsidies given
the states each year for support of their respective National Guard organizations as
"bribes" to sweep away gubernatorial opposition to overseas training missions. See supra
notes 151-53 and accompanying text. It is clear that federal officials contemplated this very
course of action prior to enactment of the Montgomery Amendment. See Carney, Army
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would be to amend the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952 by
either narrowing or removing altogether the section 233(c) guber-
natorial consent provision. Congress selected this latter option and
Governor Perpich brought suit.
The district court held that Congress could constitutionally
withdraw the consent provision since it was included in the Act
merely as an accommodation to the states.234 The court based its
conclusion upon the rule set forth in the Selective Draft Law
Cases. There, the United States Supreme Court determined that
the states' militia powers do not inhibit the federal government's
exercise of the army power.235 This conclusion should be re-ex-
amined for the reasons stated previously.2 36
A more complete analysis of this problem would examine the
burden placed upon the various states' militia rights. If that bur-
den exceeded the "merely incidental" threshold, then the court
would have to decide the appropriate level of scrutiny to apply to
the statute. The final step in the analysis would be to examine the
federal "ends" furthered by the Montgomery Amendment and the
"means" embodied by the statutory scheme.
B. How the Montgomery Amendment Affects the States'
Militia Rights
The states enjoy the constitutionally guaranteed right to
maintain their own militia.3 7 The initial question in Perpich is
whether use of the army power as embodied in general federal
legislation, and the Montgomery Amendment in particular, in-
fringes upon the militia powers reserved to the states.
Prior to adoption of the Montgomery Amendment, federal
law saddled all National Guardsmen with mandatory duty as
Army Reservists. 38 This federal requirement persists.239 Under
Threatens To Withhold Support From Ohio Guard, Army Times, June 22, 1987, at 4, col.
1.
234. Perpich v. United States Dep't of Defense, 666 F. Supp. 1319 (D. Minn. 1987),
appealfiled, No. 87-5345-MN (8th Cir. Aug. 12, 1987). Accord Dukakis v. United States
Dep't of Defense, 686 F. Supp. 30 (D. Mass. 1988), afd, No. 88-1510 (lst. Cir. Oct. 25,
1988)(per curiam).
235. Perpich, 666 F. Supp. at 1323-24 (citing Selective Draft Law Cases).
236. See supra notes 211-21 and accompanying text.
237. See supra notes 44-58 and accompanying text.
238. See supra notes 135-37 and accompanying text.
239. 32 U.S.C. § 101(3)-(5) (1986)(members of the National Guard are members of
the Army Reserve as well).
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the Montgomery Amendment, these same reservist/guardsmen
are required to participate in substantial federal training maneu-
vers.2 40 The states bear the burden of demonstrating that these
federal applications of the army power have interfered with their
ability to maintain their respective state militia.
There exists little evidence suggesting that the guardsmen's
mandatory service in the Army Reserve has hampered the Na-
tional Guard's recruiting efforts.2 41 There is, however, some indi-
cation that a federal training program which is too rigorous could
disenchant many individuals who would otherwise consider duty
with the Guard. 242 Federal training requirements implemented
under the Montgomery Amendment may cause numerous citizens
to avoid National Guard service thereby intruding upon the states'
right to maintain a militia.
Another concern is the level of danger involved when the Na-
tional Guardsmen are shipped away on federal training mis-
sions. 43 The Army tends to involve National Guard troops, who
are on federal training missions, in combat scenarios. National
Guardsmen from Washington state, while on a three week federal
training mission, were used in an in-flight refueling mission during
the 1986 bombing raid on Libya.244 Arkansas National Guards-
240. See infra note 242.
241. Although there has been gathered no such evidence, it is entirely possible that
persons morally opposed to service in the U.S. Army are deterred thereby from serving in
the National Guard. A further possibility is that prospective National Guardsmen would be
steered away because the possibility of foreign duty in the army would take them away
from their families and homes. See Kitfield, supra note 151, at 53 (Of the National
Guardsmen sent to Honduras for training, "many of the teenage men were away from their
families for the first time and were obviously homesick, and one of [the best sergeants in
the unit] had faced the penalties of being absent without leave rather than making the
trip.").
242. "In the late 1970's, all enlisted men and officers trained [with the army] 39
days a year; today, enlisted men average between 40 days and 50 days of training [with the
army] and officers 70 days." Kitfield, supra note 151, at 57. One National Guard com-
mander claims that the federal government seems to hold the erroneous belief that it "com-
mands the guardsmen seven days a week, 24 hours a day . . . while [t]he state [govern-
ments] know that ... [i]f you just keep piling on requirements, then one of these days
we'll probably crack under the strain." Id.
243. Ohio Governor Celeste wanted to prevent his Ohio National Guard troops from
travelling to Honduras for federal training because of the close proximity to "war-torn
Nicaragua." Nicaragua Training for Guard in Doubt, The Plain Dealer (Cleveland), Oct.
12, 1987, at B2, col. 4. Concern for the safety of National Guardsmen was voiced within
the House of Representatives as well. 132 CONG. Rac. H6,266 (daily ed. Aug. 14,
1986)(statement of Representative Bonior)("Training National Guardsmen in Honduras
presents risks which need not be taken ....").
244. Nelson, National Guard Now Used as Auxiliary Fighting Force, L.A. Times,
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men, while on federal training, participated in the 1983 Grenada
operation. 4 5 Incidentally, the Governors often do not learn that
their National Guardsmen were involved in offensive combat oper-
ations until after the fact.248 Even the recent training exercises in
Central America involve danger to the Guardsmen because of
their proximity to hostile enemy forces.2 47 If the states can show
that this hazardous duty frustrates National Guard recruiting ef-
forts, then their militia rights are being arguably infringed upon.
Finally, the federal training programs may make any state
conducted training impractical.2 48 Training of the militia is a pre-
rogative expressly reserved to the states.2 49 This provides State
Governors with the alternative argument that excessive federal
training under the Montgomery Amendment precludes state con-
ducted training exercises.
Whichever approach the Governors select, they have a diffi-
cult burden of proof in demonstrating federal interference with
state militia rights. The Supreme Court has displayed a general
reluctance to overturn Congressional legislation under the army
power, as seen in numerous rulings where the Court argues that
Aug. 10, 1986, at El, col. 4 ("[A] crew of eight Air National Guardsmen from Washing-
ton state took part in the raid on Libya-refueling aircraft used in the operation from a
tanker over the Atlantic, while they were officially on a three-week 'training mission' in
Morocco."). See also Glickman, supra note 11, at 4, col. 4 ("[A] Washington Air Guard
plane refueled U.S. jets headed for the bombing of Libya.").
245. Nelson, supra note 244, at El, col. 4 ("Another [Air National Guard] crew,
this one from Arkansas, participated in the Grenada operation, also while on a 'training
mission.' "). See also Glickman, supra note 11, at 4, col. 4 ("Arkansas Air Guard units
refueled planes on their way to the December 1983 Grenada invasion.").
246. See, e.g., Nelson, supra note 244, at El, col. 5 ("Washington state Gov. Booth
Gardner did not have prior knowledge of his state Air National Guard's deployment in the
Libya bombing.").
247. See Wootten, Honduras: U.S. Military Activities, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH
SERVICE ISSUE BRIEF Order Code IB84134, at 10 (Sept. 23, 1987)(authored by James P.
Wootten, Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division) ("Opponents of National Guard
participation in Honduran training exercises see Honduras as a tinderbox and do not be-
lieve that training should be conducted where there is a danger of hostilities."). Nicara-
guan troops have been known to venture as far as twelve miles into Honduran territory to
attack contra troops. Id. at 5. Furthermore, National Guard officials within the Pentagon
claim that the President could deploy "Guard units on maneuvers in Honduras into combat
against Nicaragua" under certain circumstances. Glickman, supra note 13, at 8. Nicara-
guan President Daniel Ortega has suggested that the Honduran training missions could
"turn into a direct confrontation" between National Guardsmen and his own troops.
Nusser, Ortega Says U.S. Forces Near Nicaraguan Border, Wash. Post, Dec. 4, 1986, at
A27.
248. See supra note 242.
249. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
250. See supra notes 158-93 and accompanying text.
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the particular constitutional right infringed upon by the army
power has suffered only an "incidental" burden.251 A finding that
there exists only an incidental burden will result in virtually no
scrutiny and an automatic upholding of the statute.252 On the
other hand, if sufficient interference with state militia rights is
shown, then the burden of justifying the statute shifts to the fed-
eral government. The difficulty in meeting this burden will depend
on which "level of scrutiny" the Court decides to apply.
C. Level of Scrutiny
Analogy to the substantive due process branch of constitu-
tional jurisprudence aids in this analysis. The analogy is appropri-
ate because a state's second amendment right to maintain "a well
regulated Militia" 253 compares favorably with the various liberties
guaranteed to individuals by the Bill of Rights. This mode of anal-
ysis begins with the simple proposition that whenever government
action interferes with the full enjoyment of a constitutional right
the court must decide which one of the two will prevail.
The initial step in this analysis is to examine the nature of
the constitutional right involved. The importance of the infringed
right will determine how closely the federal government's action
will be scrutinized. Statutes which encumber highly valued consti-
tutional rights will be analyzed under the "strict scrutiny"' ' stan-
dard. Constitutional rights of lesser importance trigger "interme-
diate" 255 or even "deferential" 258 scrutiny of the governmental
conduct. Application of heightened scrutiny favors a state chal-
lenge of the Montgomery Amendment because it increases the
burden upon the federal government in justifying the statute.
In setting the level of judicial scrutiny, a finding that a par-
ticular right has been historically sheltered from government in-
trusion has been held to lead to a strict scrutiny level of review. 57
251. See supra notes 175-85 and accompanying text.
252. Id.
253. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
254. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376 (1971)(governmental inter-
est must be "compelling" and means must be "necessary").
255. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976)(governmental interest must
be "important" and means must be "substantially related").
256. See, e.g., Cleland v. National College of Business, 435 U.S. 213, 220
(1978)(governmental interest must be "legitimate" and means must be "rationally
related").
257. See, e.g., Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)("Appropriate
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Likewise, those rights which are textually committed are often
protected by application of strict scrutiny.25
Certainly, both of these theories favor application of strict
scrutiny whenever the federal government infringes state militia
rights. Militia rights have been accorded tremendous respect
throughout our nation's history. Federal reluctance to infringe
state militia rights began in the pre-Constitutional years259 and
has extended into the twentieth century.8 0 Additionally, the state
militia rights are textually committed because they are found in
the second amendment.261 The fact that these rights are secured
by the text of the Constitution suggests that they should not be
lightly cast aside.
Notwithstanding the factors compelling application of strict
scrutiny to the Montgomery Amendment, prior cases indicate that
the Supreme Court is inclined to uphold army power legislation.2 62
The Court has established a limited role for itself in deciding
these cases.263 Because the Constitution allows the elected
branches of government to decide the limits of the army power,264
and because of the Court's perceived lack of competence in the
area,265 intermediate or perhaps even deferential scrutiny will be
applied to the Perpich litigation.
No matter which level of scrutiny is deemed appropriate, two
final inquiries must be made: (1) the ends furthered by the statute
must be examined, and (2) the means chosen to effectuate the
limits on substantive due process come. . . from careful respect for the teachings of his-
tory [and] solid recognition of the basic values that underlie our society.").
258. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343-44 (1963)(holding that provision
of counsel, as mandated by the sixth amendment, was "a fundamental right, essential to a
fair trial"). Numerous other cases have, similar to Gideon, designated textually committed
rights as deserving of special treatment. See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969)(the
sixth amendment double jeopardy prohibition); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145
(1968)(the sixth amendment jury trial guarantee); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14
(1967)(the sixth amendment right to compulsory process for obtaining the presence of
favorable witnesses); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (the fifth amendment self in-
crimination prohibition); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)(the first amendment
right to religious freedom); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963) (the fourth amendment
right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures).
259. See supra notes 4-8 and accompanying text.
260. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. Even as late as 1952 this trend was
apparent. See supra notes 148-49 and accompanying text.
261. See supra notes 44-58 and accompanying text.
262. See supra notes 158-93 and accompanying text.
263. See supra note 154.
264. See supra note 155.
265. Id.
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statutory goals must be analyzed. The level of scrutiny applied by
the Court is of little concern in the Court's analysis of the ends
furthered by the Montgomery Amendment. The statute's ends will
pass constitutional muster even under the strictest of scrutiny.
However, the level of scrutiny assumes a larger, perhaps even out-
come determinative role, when the propriety of the statute's
means are measured.
D. Ends Analysis
There are two federal interests apparent in the Montgomery
Amendment: (1) fulfillment of the federal duty to provide an ef-
fective national defense; and (2) preservation of federal power
over foreign affairs by excluding state interference.
Responsibility to provide an effective national defense for the
benefit of the states and all their citizens is explicitly allocated to
the federal government in the text of the Constitution. 6 The
power to provide for the common defense is the most basic obliga-
tion of our government and has received broad construction in the
courts.2"7 The Montgomery Amendment enables federal training
of the National Guard so that these troops will respond in an able
fashion268 when needed. The statute is clearly intended to enhance
the nation's ability to defend herself. The magnitude of this inter-
est is made compelling because of the central role which the Na-
tional Guard plays in our national defense system. 69
Similar to its obligation to secure the defense of the nation,
the federal government is also required to conduct the nation's
foreign affairs.2 7 0 The United States cannot accomplish this diffi-
266. "The Congress shall have Power To ... provide for the common Defence and
general Welfare of the United States . U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. See also supra
note 43 and accompanying text.
267. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
268. See supra note 229 and accompanying text.
269. See supra notes 223-28 and accompanying text.
270. It is well established that the power to determine foreign policy rests with the
federal government alone. The Constitution accomplished this by expressly granting foreign
policy powers to the President and the Congress while concomitantly denying them to the
states. U.S. CONsr. art. II, § 1, cf. 1 (President shall be commander in chief of the army);
U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (President has power to make treaties and appoint ambassa-
dors); U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (Congress has power to regulate commerce with foreign
nations); U.S. Cowsr. art. I, § 8, cl. 10 (Congress has power to define and punish felonies
on the high seas and offenses against the law of nations); U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 10, cl. 1
(states may not enter into treaties); U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 10, cl. 2 (restricting states' ability
to interfere with foreign commerce); U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 (restricting states' abil-
ity to conduct war). See also Note, Notes on Presidential Foreign Policy Powers, 11 HOF-
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cult task unless she is able to speak in one unified voice in her
dealings with the international community.
The Federal Government, representing as it does the collective
interests of the forty-eight states, is entrusted with full and ex-
clusive responsibility for the conduct of affairs with foreign sov-
ereignties . . . . Our system of government is such that the in-
terest of the cities, counties and states, no less than the interest
of the people of the whole nation, imperatively requires that fed-
eral power in the field affecting foreign relations be left entirely
free from local interference.2 '
By refusing to allow their National Guard troops to train in
Honduras, the Governors sought to impose their foreign policy
ideas on the President . 27  This result is wholly unacceptable. It
would effectively allow fifty different people to pass on the propri-
ety of the United States' military presence in different parts of the
world. Even if the Governors could be trusted to always exercise
their National Guard prerogatives consistent with the overall na-
tional interest,73 this intrusive meddling in foreign policy would
be disastrous. The country would be pulled in fifty different direc-
tions. This would result in internal chaos and would damage the
image of the United States before the world community.
The exercise of the various foreign policy powers ranks as a
"compelling" governmental interest. The Montgomery Amend-
ment advances this interest by protecting the federal government's
ability to formulate foreign policy free from the distracting influ-
ence of those State Governors who would otherwise interfere.
The final step in the analysis is to examine the means selected
to provide for the national defense in the Montgomery
Amendment.
SMRA L. REv. 413, 441 (1982)(a theme running throughout the Constitution is the subordi-
nation of the states to the national government in the area of foreign affairs). See generally
Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981)(President has broad discretion when re-
sponding to hostile acts of foreign sovereigns); Zscherniq v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429
(1968)(state laws that intrude on the area of foreign affairs will not be upheld); Takahashi
v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S., 410 (1948)(Congress determines the conditions gov-
erning the admission, naturalization, and residence of aliens; the states can neither add to
nor take from these conditions); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304
(1936)(President has broad discretion in the field of international relations).
271. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 63 (1941).
272. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
273. History teaches that certain Governors might misuse their control over the Na-
tional Guard to further their own political careers. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S.
483 (1954)(Governor Fabus of Arkansas deployed National Guard troops to block U.S.
Supreme Court ordered integration of a Little Rock high school).
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E. Means Analysis
The level of scrutiny274 will determine how penetrating the
judicial analysis will be. If the scrutiny is strict then the means
must be "necessary. ' 275 This suggests the unavailability of alter-
native means to effectuate the statutory goal. If the scrutiny cho-
sen is intermediate or deferential then the means chosen in the
statute will more easily survive analysis. Intermediate scrutiny re-
quires means that are "substantially related"2 7 to the statutory
ends; deferential scrutiny imposes the minimal "rationally re-
lated" 27 7 standard.
As noted previously, there existed several viable alternatives
short of amending the statutory gubernatorial consent provision. 78
The availability of these alternatives, all less burdensome upon
state militia rights, forecloses the possibility of the Montgomery
Amendment surviving principled constitutional analysis under the
strict scrutiny standard.
If, on the other hand, some lesser form of scrutiny is applied,
then it is unclear whether the statute will satisfy the appropriate
standard. Notwithstanding the availability of alternatives, the
statutory means probably do meet the "rationally related" test.
Under the "substantially related" standard, however, the is-
sue becomes very close indeed. Perhaps under this intermediate
standard the availability to the federal government of alternatives
suggests that the state interest should prevail. Another important
factor would be the cost involved if the federal government were
to pursue the alternative means. Prohibitive cost would eliminate
apparent alternatives from the equation, thus strengthening the
federal government's argument in support of the statute.
CONCLUSION
The language in the main constitutional text has been consid-
ered dispositive by the courts and the commentators in their writ-
ings dealing with issues of shared federal/state control of the Na-
tional Guard. This Note argues that the second amendment must
be considered as well. There are several implications of this new
274. See supra notes 253-65 and accompanying text.
275. See supra note 254.
276. See supra note 255.
277. See supra note 256.
278. See supra text accompanying notes 232-33.
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analysis. Indeed, it might alter the outcome of cases such as
Perpich because it presupposes that adoption of the second
amendment elevated the state militia rights to a more protected
constitutional status. Thus, careful balancing of the relative state
and federal interests must be undertaken before Congressional
legislation impacting state militia rights can successfully pass con-
stitutional muster.
JAMES T. LANG
LT, JAGC, USN

